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ARTICLE

Arbitral Courts
PAMELA K. BOOKMAN*
In recent years, states from Delaware to Dubai have been establishing something in
between courts and arbitration, what this Article calls “arbitral courts.” Arbitral courts
mimic arbitration’s traditional features. They hire internationally well-regarded judges who
may also work as arbitrators. They claim the neutrality, expertise, and sometimes the
privacy and confidentiality of international arbitration. Unlike arbitration, however, they
bind third parties, develop law, and wield the power of the state.
This Article identifies, theorizes, and explores the significance of these new arbitral
courts. Arbitral courts unsettle traditional distinctions between public and private
adjudication. Their appearance has significant consequences not only for understanding the
state of the evolving international judicial system, of which U.S. courts have historically
been an important part, but also for the future of legitimacy and transparency in dispute
resolution around the world.
There is much to applaud about the innovation of arbitral courts. But questions
remain about whether there is and should be a dividing line between public and private
adjudication. This Article uses arbitral courts to investigate that line by distinguishing
between courts’ and arbitral tribunals’ claims to legitimacy and their needs for
transparency and publicity. It argues that arbitral courts have the potential to develop
influential transnational law—if they can maintain the traditional openness of courts
despite parties’ preferences for confidentiality. To do so, they should publicly declare their
commitment to being a public institution and take other steps to ensure that they maintain
transparency over time, even when other forces—like the parties’ preferences—pressure
them to become more private.

* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. For helpful conversations, I am grateful to
Susan Block-Lieb, Harlan Cohen, Courtney Cox, John Coyle, Zach Clopton, Nestor Davidson, Bill
Dodge, Robin Effron, Howie Erichson, Maggie Gardner, Jennifer Gordon, Craig Green, Clare
Huntington, Tara Leigh Grove, Dave Hoffman, Rebecca Ingber, Josh Karton, Andrew Kent, Alyssa
King, Youngjae Lee, Ethan Leib, Will Moon, David Noll, Steve Sachs, Sepehr Shashahani, Aaron
Simowitz, Richard Squire, and Chris Whytock. This Article also benefited from discussion following
presentation at the Junior International Law Scholars Association Workshop at Cornell Law School,
the Duke Roundtable on Judicial Administration, the Fifth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop at the
University of Texas School of Law, the Private International Law Roundtable at the University of
North Carolina School of Law, and a targeted workshop at Fordham Law School. Thank you to
Shannon Coffey, Tori Mobilio, Aleksandra Ryshina, John Lucas Varney, Corinne Zucker, and Jennifer
Dixon and the Fordham Law Library for excellent research assistance. Finally, great thanks are due to
the editors of the Virginia Journal of International Law.
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“Once upon a time, I . . . dreamt I was a butterfly . . . Soon I awaked, and
there I was, veritably myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a
man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I
am a man.”
– Zhuangzi (Chinese philosopher, c. 369 BC – c. 286 BC)1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, Delaware enacted a statute allowing Chancery Court judges to
act as arbitrators.2 For controversies involving at least one Delaware business
entity, no consumers, and amounts in dispute over $1 million, the parties
could agree to have a Chancery Court judge arbitrate their dispute. The
proceedings would be confidential and held in the Delaware courthouse for
a filing fee of $12,000, plus $6,000 for each additional hearing day. Regular
Chancery Court procedure and evidence rules would apply, but the parties
could agree to modify them.3 The judges could grant any remedy they
“deem[ed] just and equitable and within the scope of any applicable
agreement of the parties.”4 The losing party could appeal the “order of the
Court of Chancery” to the Delaware Supreme Court, but subject to Federal
Arbitration Act standards of review. The arbitration petitions and decisions
would be confidential, but once appealed they could become part of the
public record.5 Delaware designed the statute, Chief Justice Myron Steele
explained, “to keep the United States, and in particular, Delaware,
competitive in international business dispute resolution.”6
In 2013, a Third Circuit panel declared that these “governmentsponsored arbitrations” violated the First Amendment’s right of public
access to trials because of their confidential nature.7 The Third Circuit
judges debated whether the Delaware statute created a court that had some
arbitration-like features (like confidentiality, optional procedural rules,
limited appellate review), which would require public access, or an arbitral
tribunal that had some court-like features (Delaware Chancery judges,
Delaware courthouse), which would not. In fractured decisions, two of the
three judges thought Delaware had unconstitutionally created confidential
1. WILLIAM EDWARD SOOTHILL, THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA: LECTURES DELIVERED
AT OXFORD 75 (1913) (quoting 1 THE TEXTS OF TAOISM 197 (James Legge trans., 1891)).
2. See DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 10, § 349 (2009); Del. Ch. Ct. R. 96-98.

3. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013).
4. Id. at 513.
5. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1821 (2014).
6. Myron T. Steele et al., Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
375, 380 (2013).
7. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 733 F.3d at 512, 521. Judge Roth of Delaware dissented.
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courts.8 Delaware’s courts had to be open to the public.9 The Third Circuit
thus thwarted Delaware’s attempt to create a court-arbitration hybrid—what
this Article calls an “arbitral court.”10
The Third Circuit’s decision reflects both conventional civil procedure
theory and arbitration theory about the dividing line between courts and
arbitration. According to these theories, courts are public, “procedurally
rigorous,” and state-sponsored; arbitration is private, “faster and cheaper but
with fewer procedural safeguards.”11 Courts’ authority derives from the
state; their power extends as far as the state’s.
Arbitration, by contrast, is understood as both a private dispute
resolution mechanism replacing courts and a creature of contract.12 The
parties’ agreement both defines and limits arbitral tribunals’ authority. While
scholars have recognized a convergence of procedures in different fora13
and bemoaned both the privatization of court procedure14 and the
judicialization of arbitration,15 the understanding has been that courts and
arbitration stay in their lanes.16
Over the past fifteen years, however, a new wave of courts has exploded
those traditional distinctions. In addition to the Delaware experiment,
international commercial courts that borrow traits from arbitration have
been established in Dubai (2004), Singapore (2015), the Netherlands
8. Id. at 521.
9. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2937 (2015) (discussing the importance of “public faith in the
Delaware judicial system”).
10. This term has occasionally been used to describe international arbitration tribunals, like the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, see, for example, Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial
System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 482 (2003), or private community tribunals, see, for example, Joseph
Kary, Judgments of Peace Montreal’s Jewish Arbitration Courts, 1914-1976, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 436, 436
(2016). Here, it describes domestic courts that mirror arbitration.
11. Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE
L.J. 2994, 2996 (2015).
12. See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and
Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 458-69 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Aaron D. Simowitz, Convergence and the Circulation of Money Judgments, 92 S. CAL. L. REV .
1031 (2019); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 442
(2010).
14. See, e.g., Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5; Hazel Genn, What Is Civil Justice For? Reform,
ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (2012); Dustin B. Benham, Foundational and
Contemporary Court Confidentiality, in DANGEROUS SECRETS: CONFRONTING CONFIDENTIALITY IN
OUR PUBLIC COURTS (2020).
15. See, e.g., Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223, 227 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119 (2019)
(detailing the Supreme Court’s treatment of litigation and arbitration as opposites); cf. Hiro N. Aragaki,
The Metaphysics of Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 541 (2018) (debunking conventional wisdom about the sharp
divide between courts and arbitration in order to contemplate the existential question of what
arbitration is).
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(2019).17 In the same period, tax havens such as Bermuda, the British Virgin
Islands, and the Cayman Islands, the place of incorporation for many
foreign firms, have established new business courts that “look a lot like
commercial arbitration.”18 This Article considers Delaware’s governmentsponsored arbitration experiment, some international commercial courts,19
and these offshore business courts to be “arbitral courts.”
Arbitral courts are domestic courts. Individual states20 create and fund
them (at least as a formal matter; if funded by users’ fees, those are paid to
the state and can be redistributed as the state sees fit). Arbitral courts render
binding decisions that have the force of legal judgments, enforceable by the
power of that creating state. They can issue subpoenas and injunctions.
They can join or bind non-consenting third parties. They can develop law;
under common law traditions, they can declare law and establish precedent.
The subject matter of the disputes, the parties to the disputes, and even the
judges may be foreign to the state, but the institution of the arbitral court is
domestic to the creating state.
Courts, especially commercial courts, have been trying to respond to
parties’ preferences for speed, flexibility, and expertise for decades.21 In a
number of ways, court procedure has become increasingly privatized—for
example, through managerial judging, court-annexed arbitration, and
increased party control over procedures.22
Arbitral courts take these efforts several steps further—blatantly
replicating features of international commercial arbitration.23 They allow
17. Many, but not all, of the courts known as “international commercial courts” would fit this
Article’s definition of arbitral courts. See infra Part II.
18. Will Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. L. R EV. 1403, 1441 (2020).
19. There is a small but growing literature on international commercial courts—domestic courts
with subject matter limited to international commercial disputes. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The
Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT’L L. 227, 230 n.13 (2020) (collecting sources). Much of this
literature acknowledges that these courts have borrowed some features from international commercial
arbitration and considers whether they can effectively compete with arbitration to be disputants’
chosen forum. See, e.g., Janet Walker, Specialized International Courts: Keeping Arbitration on Top of Its Game,
85 INT’L J. ARB., MEDIATION & DISP. MGMT. 2 (2019); Dalma Demeter & Kayleigh M. Smith, The
Implications of International Commercial Courts on Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB . 441, 441 (2016); Stephan
Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration—Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan Horse?, 11
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 153 (2018); Thomas Schultz & Clément Bachmann, A Wig for Arbitrators: What
Does it Add? (King’s Coll. London L. Sch., Paper No. 2019-33, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y3wqkxtm.
20. “State” here refers to a sovereign, whether a U.S. state, foreign country, or foreign locality.
See State, in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
21. See, e.g., John Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915,
1921 (2012); The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and
Wales, Grand Court of the Cayman Islands Guest Lecture: Giving Business What It Wants – A Well
Run Court for Commercial and Business Disputes (Mar. 2, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y4eqk82q.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. At its most basic, “[a]rbitration is a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to
a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties [in accordance with the parties’
agreement to arbitrate], to render a binding decision resolving [that] dispute in accordance with neutral,
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parties to choose which forum hears the dispute (often regardless of the
states’ connections to it); which procedures guide the dispute; whether the
proceedings or the decision will be open to the public or kept confidential;
and what law governs the dispute, potentially even if parties select nonstate-created law, like general equitable principles, or rules articulated by
organizations like the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL). Although arbitral courts operate in English—even in
non-English-speaking countries—the courts employ foreign judges and
allow foreign lawyers to appear before them. They also permit parties to opt
out of appeals.
This Article identifies, theorizes, and explores the significance of
arbitral courts.24 Descriptively, the Article recognizes arbitral courts as the
vanguard of international commercial dispute resolution.25 They are
domestic institutions designed to hear cases involving actors or
controversies that cross borders.26 As such, they are an important addition

judicial procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard.” GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (2d ed. 2015); see also id. at 131-32 (collecting definitions
of arbitration).
24. Scholars have recognized that several international commercial courts appear to be “hybrid”
courts. But the literature neither offers a robust description of what that means, nor does it analyze
international commercial courts together with other examples of arbitral courts, like the Delaware and
Cayman Islands examples. See, e.g., Firew Tiba, The Emergence of Hybrid International Commercial Courts and
the Future of Cross Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in Asia, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 31, 32, 47
(2016) (defining the SICC as a hybrid international court because “some of its judges are from overseas
jurisdictions”); Yuko Nishitani, Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law, 59 JAPANESE
Y.B. INT’L L. 300, 306 (2016) (“[S]ome jurisdictions have started providing, in international commercial
cases, new dispute resolution mechanisms that transcend the conventional threshold between litigation
and arbitration.”); Aragaki, supra note 16, at 564-65 (asking whether international commercial courts
like the one in Singapore is an example of “arbitration” or a “court,” and whether the question matters).
25. This Article focuses on international commercial disputes for several reasons. First, the
arbitral courts studied here focus on those disputes. Second, that focus facilitates more coherent
discussion about a specific kind of arbitration, avoiding confusion stemming from the multiplicity of
different kinds of arbitration. See, e.g., Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1129
(choosing the same focus for similar reasons). Third, international commercial disputes involve high
stakes—not just in terms of the dollar amounts in controversy, but in terms of their impact on global
governance, as the natural result of an expanding global economy. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET &
FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION,
GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY (2017). Future research should explore the possibility and implications
of arbitral courts in other areas.
26. By contrast, international institutions are created and supported by multiple states. Examples
of international courts include the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and the International Criminal Court. The distinction between courts and arbitration on the
international plane—such as the proper classification of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague—raises different sets of issues beyond the scope of this Article. See generally INTERNATIONAL
COURT AUTHORITY (Karen Alter et al. eds., 2018); LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
(Nienke Grossman et al. eds., 2014); Benedict Kingsbury, International Courts: Uneven Judicialization in
Global Order, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Crawford & M. Koskenniemi
eds., 2011).
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to the “international judicial system.”27 Theoretically, the Article situates the
emergence of arbitral courts in the context of broader debates over
public/private distinctions,28 the judicialization of arbitration, and the
privatization of procedure.29
Arbitral courts shift and blur traditional boundaries between public and
private adjudication. They reveal the power of procedural innovation and
forum shopping as forces of institutional change, which I have explored in
previous work.30 But as institutions at the cross-roads of public and private
adjudication, arbitral courts reveal not only the possibilities but also the
limits of experimentation and party autonomy over procedure, especially if
the parties control whether proceedings, opinions, and judgments are kept
confidential. To establish and maintain their legitimacy, their future impact
and ability to attract cases, and their capacity to develop law, arbitral courts
should take steps early on to dedicate themselves to being public institutions.
Likely incentive structures may lead arbitral courts to cater to parties’
requests for confidentiality. This Article therefore advocates that arbitral
courts should take extra steps to bind themselves now to transparency
protocols that would reject or significantly limit grants of such requests.
Part II of this Article describes the traditional divide between courts
and arbitral tribunals and then maps trends and debates about the
judicialization of arbitration and the privatization of procedure in courts.
Part III defines an arbitral court as a court that puts its publicness in the
hands of the parties—offering them options like those available in
arbitration, such as confidentiality and optional procedures, but also
allowing them access to the full breadth of the court’s state power. This Part
identifies common characteristics of arbitral courts and profiles five
prototypical examples of arbitral courts, from Delaware, the Netherlands,
Singapore, Dubai, and the Cayman Islands. These are not the only examples
27. Martinez, supra note 10; see also, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication,
61 DUKE L.J. 775, 776 (2012); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011).
28. See generally ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2009); Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425
(1982); cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 171 (“[W]e do not make a sharp theoretical
distinction between public and private law and process.”).
29. There has been much emphasis on the procedural differences between courts and arbitration,
reflecting a concern about “efficiency,” speed and costs, but translating into distinctions about
procedural flexibility, class treatment, availability of appellate review, and the like. See Bookman,
Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16 (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the differences
between litigation and arbitration). In previous work, I have demonstrated that these are not proper
distinguishing factors between public and private adjudication. Id. Increasingly, there are courts with
arbitration-like features and arbitration with litigation-like features, especially in international
commercial disputes. Arbitral courts take this overlap to a new level.
30. See Pamela K. Bookman & David Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (2017);
Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2017).
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of arbitral courts in the world, but they are the most arbitration-like courts
in each region where arbitral courts are appearing.31
Part IV, the analytical heart of the paper, evaluates three ways in which
arbitral courts test the boundaries between public and private adjudication.
It first critiques arbitral courts’ manipulation of legitimacy and jurisdiction.
Arbitral courts claim legitimacy that derives from the same source as
arbitration’s legitimacy—the parties’ freedom of contract and voluntary
submission to the forum. But they also claim jurisdiction and power that
derives from the state—asserting traditional court powers over nonconsenting parties, over issues that parties did not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction, and over general law development. This attempt at
duality may seem at first blush to lay claim to a double layer of legitimacy.
This Part argues, however, that it could instead lead to legitimacy and
enforcement problems, for example if arbitral courts exert jurisdiction over
non-consenting parties over whom they would not otherwise have
jurisdiction. Moreover, this Part draws attention to the circularity of arbitral
courts both lending legitimacy to a state that international commercial
parties might not otherwise fully trust and also borrowing power from the
state to bind third parties and make law.
A second boundary test comes from the arbitral court practice of giving
parties more control over choosing procedures, including control over
whether the proceedings and court decisions will be kept confidential. It
seems likely that arbitral courts will generously grant parties’ requests for
confidentiality, especially over time. Arbitral courts’ institutional norms, like
those in arbitration, seem focused on catering to parties’ interests—parties’
requests for efficiency, expertise, and other features they typically find in
arbitration. When given the option, parties often prefer confidential
proceedings. As is the case in international arbitration, however, allowing
the parties to have control over confidentiality determinations can
undermine strong and interrelated institutional interests in transparency,
legitimacy, and independence.32 Crossing the confidentiality line should be
the breaking point of party autonomy over procedure. Arbitral courts
should police confidentiality requests vigilantly to ensure their own legal and
sociological legitimacy; to justify their public funding, support, and power;
and to ensure their ability to perform the functions of courts, including
declaring and developing the law for the parties before them and for others.
Third, arbitral court judges also test the limits of public and private
adjudication, especially in arbitral courts that hire foreign judges. These
decision makers have a hybrid set of incentives, and potentially a hybrid
ethos—reflecting their role as decision makers hired by the state to cater to
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
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private parties’ needs and desires. This Part identifies questions for further
research about arbitral court judges’ attitudes and incentive structures.
Part V evaluates the perils and promise of arbitral courts. It warns of
the legitimacy problems that could follow if arbitral courts proceed behind
the dark veil of confidentiality. Liberal granting of parties’ requests for
confidentiality could compromise not only the decisions made in particular
cases but also arbitral courts’ ability to develop law and shape global
governance. This Part identifies arbitral courts’ potential for developing
transnational commercial law—if they contain the scope of their power
within legitimate limits and if they can resist parties’ preferences for
confidentiality. It therefore offers suggestions for how and why arbitral
courts might resist the temptation to keep proceedings private.
Part VI concludes with an agenda of further research questions.

II. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF ARBITRATION AND THE PRIVATIZATION
OF PROCEDURE
Courts and arbitration represent the public and private sides of the
binding dispute resolution coin. Traditionally, the two sides are thought to
offer contrasting options that differ significantly from each other in terms
of procedure, subject matter, decisionmakers, cost, speed, and more. A
growing theme in contemporary procedural scholarship, however, is
convergence.33 Procedures in arbitration and litigation are converging.
Arbitration, especially international commercial arbitration, is judicializing.34
Procedure in courts around the world, meanwhile, is growing privatized,
through increased managerial roles of judges, encouraging private
settlement;35 incorporation of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) as off-ramps to court process;36 and increased acceptance for
privately negotiated procedures within courts.37

33. See, e.g., Alyssa King, Global Civil Procedure, HARV. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021).
34. See, e.g., STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 84; Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox,
supra note 16, at 1169; Gerbay, supra note 15, at 227.
35. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982); Tobias Wolff,
Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027-28 (2013).
36. Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s
Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1652 (2015); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:
How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165,
166-67 (2003); Solomon Oliver Jr., Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Minorities in the Federal Courts,
39 CAP. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005); David
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. R EV. 389, 391-92; Robin Effron, Ousted, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 127, 128 (2018); Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2012); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game:
An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1494 (2013).
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And yet, certain differences should remain. Fundamentally, arbitration
is a private institution and courts are public.
This Part sets the stage for understanding the emergence of arbitral
courts by differentiating between the perceived distinctions between courts
and arbitration (e.g., speed, cost, procedural formality), and the fundamental
distinctions: the public and private sources of their authority and legitimacy,
and the resulting limitations on the power of courts and arbitral tribunals.
This Part then explores the literature on the judicialization of arbitration
and the privatization of procedure. Both of these latter trends reflect a
convergence of procedures between traditionally public and private binding
dispute resolution mechanisms, but with arbitration and courts mostly
staying in their own lanes. Judicialized arbitration is still self-evidently
arbitration, not a public, domestic judicial system; privatized procedure does
not morph courts into arbitral tribunals. Arbitral courts—the subject of the
rest of this Article—present an apex of this convergence: domestic courts
that seek to mimic arbitration to new extremes, potentially erasing the
boundary between arbitration and litigation, and raising existential questions
about what courts are.

A. Traditional Distinctions between Courts and Arbitration
Both the Supreme Court and commentators routinely depict litigation
and arbitration as starkly contrasting options for binding dispute
resolution.38 They tend to focus on certain sets of perceived differences. For
example, arbitration is said to be faster, cheaper, more efficient, more expert,
and less formal than litigation in court.39 Courts and arbitration are thought
to have different procedures40 and to adjudicate different kinds of
disputes.41 But these are not, contrary to the Supreme Court’s description,
inherent differences between the two methods. Arbitration can be slow,
expensive, and procedurally complicated. In the United States especially,

38. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 11, at 3023; Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16,
at 1123; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (distinguishing between arbitration and
the litigation procedures that arbitration “was meant to replace”).
39. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1141-42 (discussing Supreme
Court cases).
40. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (arbitration’s “essential
virtue” is resolving disputes without appellate review); Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (considering
individualized proceedings to be fundamental to arbitration); IAN MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW § 34.1 (1994) (parties choose arbitration because it lacks discovery).
41. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope
of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L.J.
381, 386 (2018). But cf. David L. Noll, Response: Public Litigation, Private Arbitration?, 18 NEV. L.J. 477,
479 (2018) (challenging this view).
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arbitration can adjudicate almost everything that can be heard in court.42
Courts, meanwhile, are working on offering the kind of efficiency and
expertise, etc., that are commonly associated with arbitration.
At their core, the difference is that courts are public and arbitration is
private. Courts’ public nature means that courts should be open to the
public—available to all comers to use them, to read their decisions, to
observe their proceedings. They employ judges paid by the state whose role
is to be public servants—adjudicating not just for the parties but with the
public good in mind.43
Both courts and arbitral tribunals are attentive to their own legitimacy.
Of course, legitimacy is a complex concept. To function, both courts and
arbitral tribunals need the public—and their users—to perceive them as
playing an appropriate role in governance and making decisions based on
law, not politics or personal preferences.44 Put another way, both courts and
arbitration need both sociological legitimacy and legal legitimacy. The
sociological legitimacy of a court depends on whether the public views the
court as worthy of respect and obedience.45 Legal legitimacy is established
if citizens believe the legal institution has a valid claim to exercise power.46
Courts’ legitimacy is intertwined with the fact that courts are arms of
the state.47 They derive their powers from the state’s sovereignty, which, in
turn, defines the scope of the court’s legitimate powers. The state’s
sovereignty enables courts to render decisions that make law, to issue
injunctions, and to assert power over any persons over whom they have
personal jurisdiction. But the source of authority also limits courts’ powers.
Law students may be well familiar with domestic law limits on the powers
of federal courts. The Constitution may also impose some limits on state
courts, for example, requiring public access.48 Sovereignty also limits court
42. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1187.
43. This is a description of the idealized role, not necessarily the reality. See, e.g., POUND INST.
FOR CIV. JUST., DANGEROUS SECRETS: CONFRONTING CONFIDENTIALITY IN OUR PUBLIC COURTS
(2020), https://tinyurl.com/y3hnyl4v; Paul L. Friedman, Threats to Judicial Independence and the Rule of
Law, A.B.A. (Nov. 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ybv8jn6u.
44. See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 23 (2018).
45. Id. at 22-23.
46. See, e.g., Jonathan Jackson, Norms, Normativity, and the Legitimacy of Justice Institutions: International
Perspectives, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 145, 149 (2018). There may also be questions of moral
legitimacy, which ask whether people ought to respect and try to obey the law “or whether
governmental officials are morally justified in coercing compliance.” FALLON, supra note 44, at 23.
47. Scholars have long grappled with the intricacies of the concept of legitimacy and this Article
does not try to engage in those debates so much as to try to apply the basic ideas of legitimacy to
arbitral courts.
48. See infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Constitution requires
open access in civil cases). As another example, on October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court heard a case
asking whether the Constitution allows state court judges to be appointed or dismissed due to political
party affiliation. Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. _ (2020). For the lower court’s discussion of the issue, see
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powers on the international plane.49 For example, for a foreign court to
recognize and enforce another court’s judgment, the rendering court must
have had jurisdiction over the case.
In recognition of the awesome state power that courts wield, states
require courts to maintain standards of fairness and due process by
requiring certain kinds of procedures and a certain amount of open access
for the public to keep tabs on what courts are doing (among other reasons).
Arbitration, by contrast, is private. It is held in private spaces. It excludes
strangers from proceedings. Parties can (but do not have to) agree not to
disclose their relationship or the arbitration’s outcome to third parties.50
Arbitral awards are made by private decision-makers who are paid by the
parties, follow procedures chosen by the parties, and bind only the parties
to the dispute. Excepting specialized regimes where parties are required by
law to arbitrate, arbitrators’ authority over a particular dispute derives
principally from—and is limited by—those parties’ private choices.
Arbitrators therefore also may have a different attitude toward decisionmaking. Their task is to resolve the dispute before them. Accordingly, some
suggest arbitrators may be less interested in “making law”; as providers of
a business service, they may be guided by commercial reasonableness as
much as, if not more than, the governing law.51
Arbitration’s legitimacy derives from at least three sources: the
arbitration agreement (the parties’ consent), an international infrastructure
undergirded by state support,52 and the virtues and reputations of the
arbitrators themselves.53 First, the private source of arbitration’s legitimacy
is from the parties’ agreement to resolve disputes arising out of their
contract in arbitration. But freedom of contract alone does not legitimize
Adams v. Governor of Del., 914 F.3d 827, 829 (3d Cir. 2019).
49. According to the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
customary international law does not confine courts’ judicial jurisdiction. This is a change from the
Third Restatement. See Pamela K. Bookman, Towards the Fifth Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law:
The Future of Adjudicative Jurisdiction Under Public International Law, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND:
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(2020). But it is uncontroversial that customary international law constrains courts’ enforcement
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hannah Buxbaum & Ralf Michaels, Reasonableness as a Limitation on the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: From 403 to 405, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF T HE UNITED STATES (2020).
50. See, e.g., Gu Weixia, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in International Commercial Arbitration?,
15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 609 (2004).
51. See JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW 40-78, 99-114 (2013).
52. Id. at 70.
53. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 45
(1996); Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years after
Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L 161, 166 (2012).
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international commercial arbitration. An international treaty, the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, established a legal infrastructure for courts to enforce arbitration
agreements, recognize and enforce arbitration awards, and aid arbitration
when a proceeding requires interim measures or injunctive relief that arbitral
tribunals lack the power to authorize.54 Over 150 countries have signed this
treaty, and it is largely an international law success story.55 Thus, arbitration’s
power derives not only from contract but also from the active consent and
support of many states—both the seat of the arbitration and the states
where enforcement is sought.56 That infrastructure reinforces the point: a
key distinction between courts and arbitration is the source of their power.
Finally, arbitrators also lend considerable legitimacy to arbitration.
Arbitrators appear more neutral because they are not state actors and
possibly do not share a nationality with one of the parties, in contrast to
judges on traditional courts. Many arbitrators are well regarded experts in
their fields. Moreover, they are chosen by the parties, and therefore even the
losing party has helped constitute the tribunal and may feel like it had an
advocate during the decision-making process. The chair of an arbitration
panel—the third arbitrator chosen by the parties’ chosen co-arbitrators57—
also has legitimacy based on the fact that they represent a choice acceptable
to arbitrators presumed to act in the interest of the parties who selected
them.
The sources of arbitration’s legitimacy both define and limit the scope
of its jurisdiction and authority. Because arbitration is “a creature of
contract,”58 parties have the freedom to control which procedures apply,
which state’s law (if any) the arbitrators should use to resolve the dispute,
and whether their process or the arbitrator’s conclusions should be kept
confidential. Similarly, because arbitration is only a creature of contract,
arbitrators are limited to resolving the dispute before them as defined by the
contract; their authority extends only to those parties that have consented
to arbitration; and they cannot enforce their own awards or exercise the
injunctive powers of the state without a court’s assistance.
54. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 16, at 1137.
55. See Martinez, supra note 10, at 441 (calling the New York Convention “one of the great
successes of international law”).
56. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013) (theorizing arbitration’s
authority as based on multiple sources, including parties’ freedom of contract and state power); see also
EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010) (theorizing
arbitration as an autonomous legal order).
57. In most high stakes arbitral disputes, “each party names a ‘co-arbitrator,’ who then jointly
select[] a ‘presiding arbitrator’.” STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 224.
58. See Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 469, 472 (2006).
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Daniel Markovits has argued that it is important to recognize that
arbitration is not one thing but two—a private replacement for judging and
a form of contract gap-filling. He criticizes “arbitration’s most enthusiastic
defenders, including the Supreme Court,” for justifying the expansion of
arbitration’s scope (for example enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer
or employment contracts) on the rationale that arbitration is merely a
replacement for judging, but then conceiving of arbitration as merely an
extension of the parties’ contract, completely manipulable by private parties,
when arbitration defenders try to “relax the law’s scrutiny of the actual
arbitral process.”59 In other countries that are more attentive to these dual
roles, one finds more external limits on arbitration’s scope. For example, in
the EU, arbitration clauses in consumer or employment contracts are not
enforceable, and in Switzerland, courts can decline to enforce arbitral awards
if the arbitral proceeding violated standards of due process, including letting
both sides be heard.60
As these examples show, arbitration, like other kinds of private ordering,
is to varying extents regulated by the state; even under the New York
Convention there are grounds for not enforcing arbitral awards, for example
if they are a result of fraud or if they exceeded the authority granted by the
parties. But such interventions, especially in international commercial
arbitration, are the exception rather than the rule. Some theorists even
conceive of international arbitration as an independent “transnational legal
order,”61 seemingly denying the possibility of state regulation external to the
private arbitration process. But regardless of arbitration’s autonomous
status, any given dispute’s parameters are still defined by the scope of the
private arbitration agreement.

B. Judicializing Arbitration
With respect to many of the so-called differences between them, courts
and arbitral tribunals adjudicating international commercial disputes have
been converging over the past few decades. In that time, international
arbitration has exploded in terms of the number of cases, amounts in
controversy, and reported popularity.62 As arbitration centers like the
59. Markovits, supra note 12, at 434.
60. Violation of Due Process, SWISS INT’L ARB. DECISIONS, https://tinyurl.com/y59dd2ec (last
visited Jan. 25, 2021); Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 10, 2007, 26 ASA BULL.
322 (Switz.); Remy Gerbay, Due Process Paranoia, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 6, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/y2s6dogb.
61. GAILLARD, supra note 56, at 35.
62. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 2-3 (collecting statistics); Horst Eidenmuller, The
Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 707, 722-23 (2011). Some empirical studies of contracts cast doubt on proclamations of
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have gained prominence, they
have also become sites of increasingly contentious, high stakes, and
complicated disputes. And they have been populated by lawyers trained in
American litigation tactics.
Scholars have cited all of these trends in explaining why and how
international arbitration has become increasingly “judicialized.”63 In the
early twentieth century, proponents of arbitration “touted [it] as a more
efficient, less costly, and more final method for resolving disputes,” with
“little or no discovery, motion practice, judicial review, or other trappings of
litigation.”64 But by the start of this century, international arbitration had
become increasingly similar to civil litigation—more “formal, costly, timeconsuming, and subject to hardball advocacy.”65 Arbitration centers now
have lengthy and sophisticated codes of procedure,66 including options for
discovery,67 class proceedings68 and internal appellate review.69 A new
generation of arbitrator also increasingly sees their role as similar to that of
a managerial judge.70
Some kinds of arbitration have also become more transparent. In
certain areas, for example, particularly investor-state arbitration, tribunals
now publish most awards.71 As a result, these arbitral awards have

arbitration’s total market dominance. See, e.g., Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of
Arbitration Clauses In International Commercial Contracts, 58 INT’L R EV. L. & ECON. 6 (2019); Christopher
A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L
L. 449, 475 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008);
Christopher Drahozal & Stephen Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. R ESOL. 433, 434 (2010).
63. See STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25 (developing a theoretical framework to explain
judicialization in terms of supporting arbitration’s legitimacy and other functional factors); Aragaki,
supra note 16, at 552 (explaining judicialization as a response to legitimacy concerns); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (quoting lawyers blaming
litigators for arbitration’s judicialization); id. at 11 (faulting the increasing complexity of arbitration
disputes).
64. Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 63, at 8.
65. Id. As I have explored elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s characterizations of arbitration even
today hew closer to the early twentieth century caricature. See Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox,
supra note 16, at 1150-63 (describing the Court’s “essentialist view” of arbitration).
66. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 84.
67. See, e.g., Giacomo Elgueta, Understanding Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration through
‘Behavioral Law and Economics,’ 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. R EV. 165 (2011).
68. See Alyssa King, Too Much Power and Not Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21 LEWIS &
CLARK L. R EV. 1031 (2017).
69. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, OPTIONAL APPELLATE ARBITRATION RULES 3 (2013),
https://tinyurl.com/y6nah3x9.
70. Schultz & Kovacs, supra note 53, at 162.
71. See, e.g., Hensler & Khatam, supra note 41, at 412 (describing ICSID’s efforts to expand
transparency).
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contributed to developing the substantive law in this area, and arbitral
awards are often cited in a quasi-precedential fashion.72
In international commercial arbitration, however, there is resistance to
this last step of judicialization. Confidentiality continues to reign supreme,
especially in terms of publication of awards.73 The arbitration institutions
seem to acknowledge a need to provide transparency into their procedures
and reasoning, but parties often choose arbitration specifically to keep their
business disputes—and other information about their businesses—
confidential. There have been several efforts to address the “confidentialitytransparency problem” without sacrificing that allegiance to
confidentiality.74 The ICC has been issuing redacted awards since the 1930s;
some other arbitration houses have begun doing so;75 some say they would
publish upon the parties’ request, but have never published any awards.76 It
is not surprising that if publication decisions are left entirely to the parties,
however, few or no awards will be published.77 Practical considerations also
impede robust publication—who covers the cost of publishing the awards
and of redacting them to preserve the parties’ autonomy?
Within the world of multinational businesses, law firms, lawyers, and
arbitrators who use or operate it, international commercial arbitration
nevertheless enjoys a high level of perceived legitimacy.78 Some scholars
have criticized adherence to confidentiality as undermining the legitimacy
of international commercial arbitration, “the arbitral order’s own claims to
operate in the public interest,”79 and arbitration’s ability to contribute to the
development of substantive law. They argue that as a private, largely selfregulating instrument of global governance, international commercial

72. See, e.g., Mark Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV .
1895 (2010) (noting that this trend is prevalent in investor-state arbitration, but much less so in
international commercial arbitration).
73. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 228.
74. See, e.g., Mary Zhao, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Adopting a Balanced
Approach, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 175 (2019) (arguing for more transparency in international commercial
arbitration); Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication of International
Arbitral Awards, 28 ARB. INT’L 447 (2012) (exploring the conflict between party and systemic interests
in transparency); Catherine Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1301 (2006) (arguing for nationally imposed disclosure obligations in international commercial
arbitration).
75. For example, the AAA-ICDR and the SIAC began publishing redacted awards in 2012. See
STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229.
76. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229 (describing the LCIA and the HKIAC).
77. See Karton, A Conflict of Interests, supra note 74 (exploring parties’ interests in confidentiality of
arbitration).
78. See, e.g., STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 219.
79. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229.
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arbitration must defend its legitimacy against detractors.80 It can be difficult
to do so if the proceedings and results are all cloaked in secrecy.
Arbitration is often praised for its flexibility and adaptability.81
Judicialization can be understood as showcasing, rather than undermining
these attributes.82 As a private legal ordering, arbitration is responsive to
users’ needs and desires. These forces have likely driven judicialization to
some extent, but they have stopped short at eliminating confidentiality in
international commercial arbitration. Confidentiality is not an inherent trait
of international commercial arbitration, but confidentiality is likely to
endure because of parties’ needs and desires,83 despite whatever institutional
costs in terms of legitimacy and efforts for international commercial
arbitration to shape and develop substantive law.

C. Privatizing Procedure
At the same time that arbitration has been judicializing, courts—
especially in the common law world—have been privatizing. This trend has
occurred along several vectors, including managerial judges, court-annexed
arbitration, and party-driven procedures.84 Overall, public adjudication in
courts has become more private and more privatized: the workings of courts
are more hidden from public view and more controlled by party preferences.
First, the judge’s role in the United States and elsewhere85 has
transformed from one running public trials to one managing cases and
80. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Legitimacy and International Arbitration: An Alternate View, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6xyk9xx; S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky
Defaults, Status Quo Bias, and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of International Arbitration,
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 533. For scholarship engaging in the legitimacy “debate,” see, for example,
GUILHERME RIZZO A MARAL, JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND ARBITRATION – ARE ARBITRATORS
BOUND BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENT? 79 (2d ed. 2018); Stephan Schill, Conceptions of Legitimacy of
International Arbitration, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (David D.
Caron et al. eds., 2015); David D. Caron et al., An Introduction, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015) (noting that as “[i]nternational
arbitration has become an institution that contributes to the shaping of law,” and international
arbitrators “contribute to the progressive development of transnational law,” concerns about
arbitration’s legitimacy have risen).
81. See, e.g., Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 63, at 51 (calling flexibility arbitration’s key
feature).
82. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 169; cf. Bookman, Arbitration-Litigation Paradox,
supra note 16, at 1124 (criticizing view of arbitration as having certain “essential” procedural features).
83. See STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 229 (predicting that arbitration houses are
unlikely to make awards public in light of party preferences).
84. See, e.g., Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 37; see also, e.g., Hoffman, Whither Bespoke
Procedure, supra note 37; Effron, supra note 37; Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Bone, supra note 37; Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 37.
85. THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE R ESOLUTION (Tania
Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013); SARAH MURRAY, THE REMAKING OF THE COURTS: LESSADVERSARIAL PRACTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AUSTRALIA
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promoting private settlement.86 The traditional trial held in open court has
all but disappeared,87 replaced by in camera conferences that are harder, or
impossible, for third parties to observe or learn about.88 The reduction in
the prevalence of trials corresponds to a reduction in the prevalence of
traditional forms of open court proceedings and precedent because disputes
are instead increasingly resolved through settlement, negotiation, and other
procedures that take place away from public view.
Second, arbitration and ADR have in some places replaced court
procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court’s liberal approach towards arbitration
clauses in consumer and employment contracts pushes large quantities of
disputes either towards arbitration or away from dispute resolution
altogether.89 In addition, experiments beginning in the 1970s allowed or
required courts to push parties into non-binding arbitration.90 These state
court experiments varied in their particulars, but the basic idea was that
courts either encouraged or forced parties to arbitrate their disputes in order
to clear court dockets and ideally to foster faster and cheaper claim
settlement.91 Court-annexed arbitration was private and confidential on the
reasoning that secrecy facilitates negotiation and settlement.92 These
processes are, importantly, not the same as arbitral courts—the arbitration
proceedings were an off-ramp, rather than conducted by the judge herself,
and results were not binding.93 If parties were unsatisfied with the courtannexed arbitration, they still had recourse to the court and its regular (if
slow) public procedures.94
(2014).
86. Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5, at 1806.
87. Thomas Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial: The Growth and Impact of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
88. See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 5; cf. Moon, supra note 18, at 1440 n.175 (noting
that lawyers gain useful knowledge of Delaware courts’ inner workings from experience in camera and
purchased transcripts of court statements made during bench trials or motion practice).
89. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).
90. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 36, at 178; see also ADR Overview, NYCOURTS.GOV ,
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/ny/ADR_overview.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
91. See, e.g., Resnik, Contingency of Openness, supra note 36, at 1655 (describing these processes).
92. See id.
93. In this respect they seem similar to the current structure of the Chinese International
Commercial Courts, although the ADR off-ramps in that setting may be binding. See Wei Cai & Andrew
Godwin, Challenges and Opportunities for the China International Commercial Court, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q.
869 (2019).
94. In some states, there was a sanction if the result in court turned out to be less favorable than
what the party had attained in the court-annexed procedure. Resnick, Contingency of Openness, supra note
36, at 1655.
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Third, many scholars have charted the rise of party control over court
procedures, sometimes known as “private procedural ordering.”95 In the
early twentieth century, courts would often not allow party control even in
the form of forum-selection clauses and choice-of-law clauses, which were
seen as illegitimate attempts to “oust” courts of jurisdiction.96 By the middle
of the last century, most courts had ousted ouster.97 Parties had increasing
control over their choice of forum, choice of substantive law governing
their contractual relationships, and ultimately, choice of procedures.98

III.

ARBITRAL COURTS

The judicialization of arbitration and the privatization of procedure
reveal that public and private adjudication in courts and arbitration have
been converging over time. But courts and arbitral tribunals are not the
same. Courts are part of the state. They are public institutions. They remain
primarily open to the public, with a public source of authority and funding
and the powers of injunctive relief and compulsory jurisdiction, as well as
the ability to make and develop law. Arbitration is a private institution,
primarily controlled by the parties. Arbitral tribunals lack many of the
powers of public courts. But arbitration offers parties extensive possibilities
for personalizing their preferred dispute resolution mechanism, including by
keeping it secret.
Arbitral courts test these public/private boundaries. To show how, this
Part offers a definition of an arbitral court, outlines its common features,
and examines five representative examples of arbitral courts around the
world.

A. Defining Arbitral Courts
Arbitral courts are domestic courts that challenge the fundamental
public/private divide that separates arbitration and courts as sites of binding
adjudication. Thus, arbitral courts are courts that put their public-ness in the
hands of the parties—e.g., by allowing them to opt into confidentiality, to
choose which procedural or substantive rules to follow or to avoid, and to
harness the power of the state to extend beyond the limits of their

95. See, e.g., Effron, supra note 37, at 129 n.1 (collecting scholarship).
96. Id. at 128; John Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 COLO. L. REV. 1147 (2020)
(noting early limits on parties’ ability to choose the law governing their contracts).
97. Effron, supra note 37, at 128.
98. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 37, at 1330; Bookman & Noll, supra note 30, at 777-96 (describing
parties’ roles in developing procedures to address unexpected situations in litigation); cf. Hoffman,
Bespoke Procedure, supra note 37, at 389 (documenting the limited circumstances under which parties
actually contract for special procedures).
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contractual agreements. They are designed to offer some combination of
the traits of arbitration and courts that are perceived as most attractive.
This Section identifies the characteristic features of arbitral courts, some
of which are common to all of the case studies that follow, and some of
which are typical but not necessarily found in each example of an arbitral
court. Regardless of the precise collection of arbitration-like characteristics,
arbitral courts reveal a trend that extends even beyond recognized ways in
which courts, even commercial courts, have been catering to private parties
and their disputes, mimicking arbitration, and, as we shall see, potentially
neglecting their roles as public institutions.
Arbitral courts are (1) domestic courts that have the following
arbitration-like characteristics: they (2) allow party autonomy over
procedures, (3) permit parties to opt into confidentiality, (4) exercise
jurisdiction based on consent, often without further connections to the
locality, and (5) proceed in English. They often (6) employ well paid foreign
judges who may moonlight as arbitrators, (7) use three-judge panels,
(8) offer opportunities for foreign lawyers to appear without local counsel,
(9) allow parties to opt out of the right to appeal, and (10) are willing to
enforce parties’ selection of non-state law to govern their dispute.
First, arbitral courts are domestic courts.99 They often handle crossborder disputes and have high amount in controversy requirements. They
are specialized, affording the expertise that arbitration offers.100 This
subject-matter specialization tends to mean that, like international
commercial arbitration, arbitral courts adjudicate “private” rather than
“public” disputes. But these limits are not entirely clear, and nor is the line
between public and private disputes. The Singapore and Dutch examples
allow referral jurisdiction by local courts of more general jurisdiction—that
is, the ordinary courts may refer a case to the specialized arbitral court that
focuses on international commercial disputes. The Cayman Islands court
allows more public minded proceedings, such as insolvency. Many disputes
in international commercial arbitration include states and state-related
entities;101 arbitral courts may see their fair share of such disputes in the
future. Moreover, even entirely “private” suits, when adjudicated in courts,
take on a public dimension, for the court is exercising the power of the state
and making binding law.
Second, arbitral courts allow considerable party control over
procedures. Some argue that arbitration’s hallmark is its procedural
99. As noted in the Introduction, arbitral courts are not international institutions; they do not
hear disputes between states; they do not implicate the same theoretical questions that international
“courts of arbitration” tend to raise. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Dubai Law No. 12 of 2004, art. 5; SICC PROCEDURAL GUIDE at 4.
101. See Born, New Generation, supra note 27, at 827.
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flexibility.102 In arbitral courts, parties can opt out of default procedural and
evidentiary rules, sometimes including the opportunity to appeal. In
common law courts, it is not uncommon for parties to contract over
procedures or agree to procedural deviations in certain contexts.103 But the
exceptional party autonomy in arbitral courts goes a step beyond these
trends in an attempt to offer arbitration’s characteristic flexibility.
Traditionally, parties cannot opt out of procedure or evidence rules whole
hog, nor can they opt into confidential proceedings, or out of appellate
review. Arbitral courts allow such choices. Several arbitral courts’ default
procedural rules are often borrowed directly from model arbitration rules,
which offer defaults but also allow for considerable party choice.104
Third, arbitral courts allow parties to opt into confidentiality. All of
these courts are relatively new, and for some, the standards for granting
confidentiality requests are still uncertain. In Delaware, the offer of
confidentiality was virtually absolute. More commonly, arbitral courts offer
confidentiality based on varying standards that often seem not difficult to
meet if both parties join the request, and potentially even without such
agreement.105
Fourth, arbitral courts’ jurisdiction is principally based on consent—
whether in a contract’s forum-selection clause or by incorporating in an
offshore territory—with no or minimal additional connection to the forum.
The Delaware arbitral court required at least one party to be a Delaware
entity and the Cayman Islands functionally has a similar requirement. In
both of those places, foreigners can easily incorporate and register entities
and thereby bring transnational disputes to the local courts. The other
examples, mirroring arbitration, do not require a local connection. But,
unlike arbitration, an arbitral court’s jurisdiction and powers are not limited
by the parties’ consent—that is, even under consent-based jurisdiction,
arbitral courts still can do what arbitration cannot, including join third
parties, consolidate claims, and issue injunctive relief.106 After all, a major
102. Stipanowich, New Litigation, supra note 62, at 1-2 (“The most important difference between
arbitration and litigation—and the fundamental value of arbitration—is the ability of users to tailor
processes to serve particular needs.”); Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40, [61] (appeal taken from
EWCA Civ.) (“One of the distinguishing features of arbitration that sets it apart from proceedings in
national courts is the breadth of discretion left to the parties and the arbitrator to structure the process
for resolution of the dispute.”).
103. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 37, at 653; Effron, supra note 37, at 149-50. But cf.
Dodson, supra note 84, at 2-4.
104. See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial
Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 225, 248 (2020).
105. See Zhengxin Huo & Man Yip, Comparing the International Commercial Courts of China with the
Singapore International Commercial Court, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 903, 938 (2019) (discussing
confidentiality in SICC).
106. See Drossos Stamboulakis & Blake Crook, Joinder of Non-Consenting Parties: The Singapore
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advantage that courts have over arbitration is the ability to exercise the
power of the state.
Fifth, arbitral courts, like arbitration, proceed in English, which is
remarkable in places where that is not the national language, such as the
Netherlands and Dubai.107 The adoption of the English language disrupts
common assumptions about the importance of local culture in procedure,108
and allowing English-language proceedings sometimes has required
legislative or even constitutional amendments to existing judicial
structures.109 But it also reflects apparent assumptions that parties choose
arbitration because of the availability of proceeding in English. Survey
responders rarely cite English language availability as a main attraction of
arbitration,110 but in contexts where English is the common language
between two non-English speaking parties, the possibility of proceeding in
English may be a significant draw.111
Sixth, the judges on arbitral courts are often foreign citizens or former
foreign judges who are well paid and sometimes also serve as arbitrators.112
Many arbitral courts include judges who are not nationals of the forum
state. A major draw of arbitration is not just the expertise of the decisionmakers but their apparent neutrality. This feature is particularly important in
transnational disputes, where the parties may be from different countries
and different legal traditions. Such parties often choose arbitrators who are
not co-nationals of either party; they may be wary of national courts and in
particular judges who might be biased in favor of local parties.
International Commercial Court Approach Meets Transnational Recognition and Enforcement, 1 ERASMUS L. REV.
98 (2019); Sir Rupert Jackson, Arbitrator, Lecture for the Qatar Conference: A Comparative
Perspective to Hybrid Dispute Resolution Fora 5 (Nov. 18, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y5mjlnhp
(noting most international commercial courts allow joinder, and the AIFC court allows joinder “if it is
desirable”). Joinder is not readily available in arbitration. See S.I. Strong, Third Party Intervention and Joinder
as of Right in International Arbitration, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 915, 918 (1998).
107. Other arbitral courts that operate in English in non-English-speaking countries include the
Astana International Financial Centre Court, the Qatar International Court, and the Abu Dhabi Global
Markets Court.
108. See OSCAR CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS CULTURAL CONTEXT 2 (2005).
109. See, for example, the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) and the Netherlands
Commercial Court (NCC) discussed infra Part III.B. Belgium’s attempted arbitral court required
considerable legislative gymnastics to circumvent traditional language requirements. Erik Peetermans
& Phillippe Lambrecht, The Brussels International Business Court, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 42 (2015).
110. See 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY
UNIV. OF LONDON SCH. OF INT’L ARB. 2 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/yxdzrjnx (listing enforceability,
avoiding specific legal systems, flexibility, and ability to select arbitrators as the main attractions of
arbitration (not English language opportunities)).
111. Thanks to Josh Karton for raising this point.
112. For example, Beverly McLachlin, the former Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court,
sits on the Singapore International Commercial Court as well as the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal;
she is also an arbitrator and mediator at Arbitration Place in Toronto. Julius Melnitzer, Former High
Court Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin to Join Arbitration Firm, NAT’L POST, July 25, 2018, at FP1.
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In addition to neutrality, arbitral court judges also offer subject-matter
expertise and bring their personal integrity to the process, like arbitrators. In
Delaware and the Netherlands, the availability of local judges is thought to
be a selling point; Delaware and Dutch judges have a reputation for expertise
and fairness. They may be attractive as neutral fora, therefore, to non-U.S.
or Dutch entities, although they may not be the first choice in a dispute
involving citizens of those countries. In Dubai, Singapore, and the Cayman
Islands, the courts have hired foreign jurists in addition to local members of
the bench.113 These judges’ expertise, neutrality, and integrity add to the
perceived legitimacy of the new courts, much as arbitrators’ “virtue”
supports the legitimacy of the arbitration system.114
Also like arbitrators, arbitral court judges are likely handsomely paid,
although, like arbitrators (and unlike judges), in general, their salaries may
not be publicly available.115 The Dutch courts endeavor to be “self-funding,”
i.e., funded entirely by parties’ fees.116 The Delaware experiment also
contemplated large fees compared to ordinary litigation.117 It does not
appear that those fees would have directly supplemented judges’ salaries.118
Seventh, the structure of judging may also mirror arbitration. Many
arbitral courts assign three-judge panels to adjudicate disputes, similar to
arbitration (and to certain kinds of U.S. litigation).119 To date, no arbitral
courts allow parties to choose the particular judges who will sit on their
panels.120 Instead, they compile a roster of first-rate judges, many of whom
also serve as arbitrators, and assign those judges to cases. These assignments
are not necessarily random; in the Singapore International Commercial
Court (SICC), for example, a judge may be assigned to a case because of her
nationality (for expertise in the parties’ chosen substantive law).121 This
113. Arbitral courts in Astana, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar have followed this trend. See, e.g., Tiba, supra
note 24 (discussing the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre and the Abu Dhabi
Global Market Courts); Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in
the Wake of Its Persian Gulf Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 122 (2019).
114. See infra Part IV.A.
115. It appears that SICC judges, like other Singapore trial-level judges, earn S$234,600 a year
(approximately US$173,000), a number that seems generous, but also has not changed since 1994. See
Judges’ Renumeration Act ch. 147, § 2(1) (1994) (Sing.) (statute listing judges’ salaries, available at
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/147-OR1); Sucheta Dasgupta, Salary Hike for Judges: Money Matters, INDIA
LEGAL (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y65bzdfx.
116. The Brussels International Business Court (BIBC) also aspired to be self-funding. See
Peetermans & Lambrecht, supra note 109, at 54.
117. Chancery Court judges in Delaware make over $184,000 a year. S.B. 235, 149th Gen.
Assemb. (Del. 2018).
118. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012) (“[T]he
Chancery Court judge and staff are paid their usual salaries for arbitration work.”).
119. See, e.g., Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 252.
120. In most high stakes arbitral disputes, “each party names a ‘co-arbitrator’ who then jointly
selects a ‘presiding arbitrator’.” STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 224.
121. Cf. Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the
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system allows arbitral courts to compete with arbitration on speed; one
complaint about high-profile international commercial arbitration is the
delay involved with waiting for the availability of arbitrators who are in
particularly high demand. In theory, arbitral courts could allow parties to
participate in the selection of the judges on their cases—but no current
arbitral court has such a practice.
Eighth, many arbitral courts allow foreign lawyers to appear before
them, as would be allowed in arbitration but usually not in domestic
courts.122 The availability of these opportunities may reveal whether the
arbitral court wants to attract foreigners and foreign lawyers, or whether the
focus is more on generating work for the local bar.123
Ninth, another classic difference between arbitration and litigation is the
availability of appellate review on the merits.124 Some arbitral courts offer
substantive appellate review to a specialized appellate body,125 some do not
allow appellate review,126 and some allow the parties to choose in advance
whether they want appellate review.127
Finally, arbitral courts all enforce valid choice-of-law clauses, and some,
like arbitration, enforce parties’ selection of non-state law. That is, parties
can choose to have their disputes governed by state law, like New York or
German law, or they could choose a legal system that does not come from
a state, for example, rules adopted by international bodies such as the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The
Delaware statute specifically empowered the Delaware judges to grant any
remedy that was in accordance with “general principles of law and equity”

Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting that judges are not selected based on
the case, but challenging the assumption that judges are randomly assigned in the statistical sense).
122. In the United States, foreign lawyers usually cannot appear in court if they are not admitted
to the local bar or the bar in another U.S. state. See, e.g., David Spector & Jessica Romero, Arbitration
and The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 13 ARIAS Q. U.S. 16, 16-19 (2006), https://tinyurl.com/yxly8sqg.
123. For example, SICC and DIFC allow foreign lawyers to practice before them, but the NCC,
Delaware, and Cayman Islands do not. For SICC, see Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1969, rev.
ed. 2007, ch. 322 § 18M (Sing.), https://sso.agc.gov.sg/ACT/SCJA1969. For DIFC, see Jayanth K.
Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common-Law Court in an Uncommon Environment: The DIFC Judiciary and
Global Commercial Dispute Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 529-30 (2014), and compare R. PROC.
FOR NCC DIST. CT. & NCC CT. OF APPEAL art. 3.1.1, https://tinyurl.com/y4d8pmn5 (with
exceptions, parties must be represented by members of the Dutch bar). For Delaware, see Del. Super.
Ct. R. Civ. P. 90.1 (providing rules for admission pro hac vice for attorneys not members of the
Delaware bar), and infra note 232 and accompanying text (noting local bar requirements for attorneys
to appear before the Cayman Islands FSD).
124. See Hall St. Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008); cf. STONE SWEET & GRISEL ,
supra note 25, at 229-30 (noting an increasing demand for appellate mechanisms within arbitration, and
arbitration houses’ efforts to afford opportunities for appellate processes).
125. See, for example, discussion of the NCC at infra Part III.B.
126. See, for example, discussion of the BIBC, Delaware at infra Part III.B.
127. See discussion of the NCC at infra Part III.B.
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that would be within the scope of the parties’ agreement.128 Courts, by
contrast, traditionally do not enforce choice-of-law clauses selecting nonstate law.129

B. Case Studies
This Section profiles prototypical arbitral courts from each of the
regions where states are experimenting with arbitral courts: the United
States,130 Europe,131 Asia,132 the Middle East,133 and the Caribbean.134 The
examples—from Delaware, the Netherlands, Singapore, Dubai, and the
Cayman Islands—are some of the most arbitration-like of the commercial
courts that have emerged in their respective regions. Delaware’s arbitral
court was held unconstitutional, but the Dutch, Singaporean, Dubai, and
Cayman courts are all in operation. These courts are all common-law courts
except the Dutch example. Dubai, as part of the United Arab Emirates,
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2020).
129. See Geneviève Saumier, The Hague Principles and the Choice of Non-State “Rules of Law” to Govern
an International Commercial Contract, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2014) (noting that courts’ choice-of-law
rules typically “allow only the designation of State law”).
130. Many U.S. states have opened business courts in recent decades, hoping to attract businesses
to their states and to their courts, with limited success. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 21. In theory, a state
situated outside the Third Circuit might try to establish a Delaware-inspired arbitral court and seek a
different constitutional evaluation.
131. International commercial courts have been proliferating in Europe, especially in the wake of
the Brexit vote. Many of these courts, like the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes at the
District Court Frankfurt/Main, are specialized chambers of existing courts that allow proceedings in
English, but continue to use national judges and mostly national procedures. See also Eva Lein,
International Commercial Courts in Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS 115 (Xandra
Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019). See generally Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19 (describing
these courts). The attempted Brussels International Business Court greatly resembled arbitration, but
the legislation that would have created it never passed Parliament. Geert van Calster, The Brussels
International Business Court, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS 107 (Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji
eds., 2019). It was blocked by political opposition criticizing the proposed tribunal for being a “caviar
court” catering to elites and neglecting the rest of the population. Matthias Verbergt, Controversiële
‘kaviaarrechtbank’ van Geens wordt begraven, DE STANDAARD (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/y4len9n6.
132. Legal hubs in Asia are expanding, offering litigation, arbitration, and mediation options and
hybrids in single locations. See Erie, supra note 104. Other examples of arbitral courts in the greater
Asian region include Kazakhstan’s Astana International Financial Center court. See Nicolás ZambranaTévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in the Wake of Its Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L.
REV. 122 (2019). The Chinese International Commercial Courts do not qualify as arbitral courts
because they hybridize arbitration with litigation not by incorporating arbitration-like traits into court
procedures, but rather by creating a tribunal that can urge parties toward alternative mediation or
arbitration tracks before, or instead of, proceeding to litigation, similar to court-annexed arbitration
experiments in the United States. See Cai & Godwin, supra note 93, at 895.
133. Other examples of arbitral courts in the Middle East include the Qatar International Court
and the Abu Dhabi Global Markets Court. See, e.g., Tiba, supra note 24, at 32.
134. Other examples of arbitral courts in the Caribbean include the business courts in the Cayman
Islands, Bermuda, and British Virgin Islands. See Moon, supra note 18, at 1438.
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could be roughly categorized as a civil law jurisdiction, but the Dubai
International Financial Centre (DIFC) is a separate common-law
jurisdiction, and Dubai’s arbitral court is in fact the DIFC court.
The focus here is on how each of these courts has navigated the
public/private divide between arbitration and litigation by carefully
choosing procedural traits commonly associated with one or the other. They
represent different variations on courts trying to have their cake and eat it
too—to resemble both a court and an arbitral tribunal at the same time.
Arbitral courts unsettle traditional understandings of that public/private
divide more than trends of judicialization or privatization. They represent
privatization gone so far as to possibly eclipse the public/private distinction
altogether by handing the reins over to parties to define the courts’
procedures, scope of authority, and very public nature. Perhaps ironically,
the case studies below are informed by publicly available sources and
therefore cannot reveal the extent of proceedings in which these courts have
granted parties’ requests for confidentiality.
1. Delaware
Delaware has long been an exporter of corporate law. Its state judiciary’s
expertise has helped propel Delaware’s dominance in corporate law. But
arbitration offers meaningful competition to Delaware courts, particularly
insofar as it offers valuable confidentiality of disputes.135 The law was
enacted “to enhance the Delaware courts’ prestige and extend its ability to
adjudicate the nation’s most complex business disputes.”136 It was an
“attempt . . . to marry one of America’s premier business courts to the
fundamentally more private consensual adjudicative alternative, binding
arbitration.”137
135. “Cloaking proceedings in privacy may also be a way of keeping the lid on other facts that
might prove embarrassing—or worse.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or
Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 353
(2013); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED? EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge et al. eds., 2017) (arguing that arbitration bylaws pose a threat to Delaware’s dominance in
the corporate charter competition).
136. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Life and Death of Delaware’s Arbitration Experiment, N.Y. TIMES :
DEALB%K (Aug. 31, 2012, 11:58 AM), https://tinyurl.com/y2wbxba2. The legislative history states
that the statute was “intended to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective options
for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology matters,”
which included bringing Delaware procedures into line with standard arbitration procedures, such as
confidential adjudication “in a more streamlined fashion,” and relying on parties’ consent for
jurisdiction. H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009), https://legis.
delaware.gov/BillDetail/19375.
137. Stipanowich, Arbitration Trifecta, supra note 135, at 349-50. The possibility of arbitration
bylaws is also threatening Delaware’s judicial dominance. See LoPucki, supra note 135, at 35.
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The Delaware House and Senate both approved the bill unanimously.138
It appears to have faced no opposition in the legislature.139 Parties and
potential parties to disputes before the Delaware arbitral court, presumably,
agreed to use the procedure and were interested in the forum at least in part
because it offered confidentiality. Indeed, one may wonder who would
object to two private sophisticated parties choosing a particular method of
resolving their disputes.
Nevertheless, observers raised several objections relating to the interests
of persons not represented by the parties. Observers “complained that the
confidential nature of the process harms investors (by reducing the
information available about the dispute), other businesses (by reducing the
amount of precedent on Delaware corporate law), and the public as a whole
(by reducing the public accountability of the court system).”140 As one
commenter explained, “much of Delaware’s value derives from the positive
externalities that come from its corporate law jurisprudence,” but
confidential disputes in the Delaware courts “might have the effect of
degrading the continued development of the Delaware common law.”141
The Delaware Coalition for Open Government opposed the law for
reducing access to government and public accountability of the courts.142
This group sued in the District of Delaware, arguing that the Delaware
statute permitted court proceedings “behind closed doors,” denying them
and the general public their First Amendment right of access to judicial
proceedings and records.143
138. Roll Calls, H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009),
https://tinyurl.com/yxnxfv9m.
139. This result fits with the “interest-group” theory of Delaware corporate law, which posits that
the Delaware legislature serves the “(1) the ‘consumers’ of Delaware corporate law (principally out-ofstate shareholders and managers); and (2) the interests within the state that stand to benefit in various
ways from the state’s chartering system.” Geoffrey Miller & Jonathan R. Macey, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1987).
140. Christopher Drahozal, Judge-Arbitrators in Delaware, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011),
https://tinyurl.com/y6gspqjc (citing Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Troubled Deal and the Law of
Unintended
Consequences,
N.Y. TIMES:
DEALB%K (Nov.
7,
2011,
4:12
PM),
https://tinyurl.com/yyjkhzbe); Brian Quinn, Delaware’s New Arbitration Rules, M&A LAW PROF BLOG
(Jan. 27, 2010), https://tinyurl.com/yxmbrqnn; Brian Quinn, Skyworks Fireworks, M&A LAW PROF
BLOG (Nov. 4, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/yxhnswhf.
141. Quinn, Delaware’s New Arbitration Rules, supra note 140; see also Paul Kirgis, In Court, But Out
of Sight: Chancery Court Arbitration, INDISPUTABLY (Dec. 15, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y3ory8en (citing
Quinn and raising other problems with the Delaware experiment, including the question of how
Delaware judges will prioritize their time and efforts).
142. The Coalition is a state affiliate of the National Freedom of Information Coalition (NFOIC),
headquartered at the University of Missouri. The NFOIC describes itself as “a coalition of journalists,
lawyers, elected officials, news organizations, business owners, government employees, civic
associations and private citizens who believe that government of the people, by the people and for the
people, should be open TO the people.” About, DEL. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV’T,
http://delcog.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
143. Complaint at 4, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2011)
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The First Amendment prohibits governments from “abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”144 In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme
Court held that “this protection of speech includes a right of public access
to trials.”145 But that case was about a criminal trial. The Supreme Court has
never addressed how the case applies to civil proceedings.146
The Delaware case exemplifies this lack of clarity. The district court held
that the Delaware statute’s provision for confidential proceedings by
Delaware judges in the Delaware courthouse was unconstitutional because
the proceedings were analogous to civil trials, which, under Third Circuit
precedent, require a public right of access.147 On appeal, the Third Circuit
judges considered that approach too simplistic. The judges instead followed
the “experience and logic test,” which asks whether “‘there has been a
tradition of accessibility’ to that kind of proceeding, and [whether] ‘access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process
in question.’”148 If both experience and logic favor requiring public access
to the proceeding, that establishes a presumption of public access that only
a compelling government interest can rebut.149
The judges disagreed on how to apply that test here. As for experience,
two judges held that civil trials had a history of openness, while arbitration
“reveal[ed] a mixed record of openness.”150 For the logic test, the court
identified many positive effects of access and few benefits of confidentiality
for these kinds of proceedings.151 For example, public access promotes
informed discussion of government proceedings, the perception of
fairness, a venue for airing community concerns, and a check on corruption
and fraud.152 Confidentiality, by contrast, was not so valuable, especially
(No. 1:11–1015) (“Although the statute and rules call the procedure “arbitration,” it is really litigation
under another name. Although procedure may vary slightly, the parties still examine witnesses before
and present evidence to the Arbitrator (a sitting judge), who makes findings of fact, interprets the
applicable law and applies the law to the facts, and then awards relief which may be enforced as any
other court judgment. The only difference is that now these procedures and rulings occur behind closed
doors instead of in open court.”).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
145. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980)).
146. See David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835
(2017). Most lower federal courts recognize a right to public access to civil proceedings. Id. at 858
n.142.
147. The district court “concluded that because Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration
was ‘sufficiently like a trial,’ and because a right of public access applies to civil trials, a right of public
access must also apply to Delaware arbitrations.” Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d
510, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 514 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)).
149. Id. at 514.
150. Id. at 518, 521.
151. Id. at 518-19.
152. Id.
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when parties already had access to secrecy for trade secrets and other
sensitive proprietary information. Judge Fuentes wrote separately to
emphasize that the only constitutional problem with the statute was the lack
of public access to the proceedings.153
Judge Roth’s dissent suggests that it is not entirely clear, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, what the law is and whether the Delaware courtarbitration experiment is unconstitutional.154 Focusing on the history of
arbitration, Judge Roth concluded that arbitration’s history is largely
confidential. As a matter of both history and logic, she reasoned, it makes
sense for arbitration to be confidential—and therefore, arbitration, even if
run by the state, is not subject to the First Amendment’s public access
requirement.155 Regardless of whether the majority or the dissent is right as
a constitutional matter,156 the constitutional analysis demonstrates how
arbitral courts challenge traditional public/private distinctions.
The Third Circuit’s reasoning suggests that the boundary between
public and private adjudication is defined by confidentiality. Delaware could
have continued the process—with high fees, flexible procedures chosen by
the parties, appellate review under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) standards,
etc.—if only the proceedings were made public. Delaware may have been
able to go farther than that, even under the Third Circuit’s reasoning. It likely
could have revised the statute so that the default rules for the arbitral court
made the proceedings public, but parties could opt into confidentiality with
the court’s permission. That might have created an exception that breaks the
rule, but it would have put pressure on the scope of a court’s authority to
allow confidentiality in a particular case rather than as a question of
institutional design, which might have escaped constitutional scrutiny.157
After the Third Circuit decision, however, Delaware chose not to
reenact the statute with everything except the confidentiality provision, and
also did not attempt any clever work-arounds. Instead, it enacted the
Delaware Rapid Arbitration Act (DRAA), which makes Delaware law more
arbitration friendly, for example, with provisions that prevent Delaware
courts from issuing anti-arbitration injunctions. This statute seems to have
had limited success in terms of the number of contracts that designate
arbitration under the DRAA.158
153. Id. at 521 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 526.
156. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 572 U.S.
1029 (2014).
157. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 30 (discussing expansive scope of judges’ equitable authority
to dictate procedures in particular cases); cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV.
821, 823 (2018).
158. Christopher Drahozal, Innovation in Arbitration Law, THE CLS BLUE S KY BLOG (Mar. 1,
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2. The Netherlands
Of the European international commercial courts that have been
established in the last few years, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC),
which opened in January 2019, represents the greatest challenges to the
public/private divide.
The Netherlands Commercial Court has many court-like features. It has
both a trial and appellate level. The judges are members of the Dutch
judiciary. Only Dutch lawyers, or European lawyers working with a Dutch
lawyer, can represent clients there.159
The NCC also adopts many traits of arbitration. At the trial court level,
a panel of three judges and one law clerk hears disputes.160 Like arbitration,
the NCC Rules allow considerable party autonomy over procedures.161 The
Rules align with the International Bar Association (IBA) Rules on the Taking
of Evidence in International Arbitration,162 with some exceptions, and the
parties may agree to depart from the standard rules of evidence.163
Confidentiality orders are permitted “for compelling reasons.”164 The NCC
also charges higher fees than typical Dutch courts: € 15,000 to submit an
international dispute to the NCC, and € 20,000 for an appeal, in contrast to
€ 4,000 at the trial level and € 5,000 for an ordinary appeal.165 Proceedings
and judgments are in English.166
At the December 2018 legislative hearings to approve the bill that would
establish the NCC, several members of parliament expressed concerns
about creating the chamber. Some argued that the NCC would create a twotiered judiciary—one for rich corporations, and one for the rest of the
country. They wanted assurances that “the capacity and costs of [the NCC]
2016), https://tinyurl.com/y5czfuc8; Christopher Drahozal, Innovation in Arbitration Law: The Case of
Delaware, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 499 (2016). A contract must be quite explicit in choosing to operate
under state arbitration law rather than the FAA. See, e.g., Writing Arbitration Clauses to Get the Arbitration
You Want, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:25 PM), https://tinyurl.com/yx8fjp8p.
159. Key Aspects, STIBBE, https://tinyurl.com/yxs4scuu (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
160. NCC RULES art. 3.5.2.
161. “[T]he procedural rules of the Netherlands Commercial Court provide flexibility, allowing
proceedings to be conducted either in the civil law tradition, or in a manner more similar to proceedings
in common law jurisdictions or international arbitration. This flexibility aims to make proceedings more
recognisable for international parties.” Handbook on the Netherlands Commercial Court Published, STIBBE
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yxgceapn; see also NCC RULES art. 3.4.1.
162. Key Aspects, supra note 159.
163. NCC RULES art. 8.3.
164. Id. art. 8.4.2.
165. Behandeling Engelstalige rechtspraak bij internationale handelskamers, EERSTE KAMER DER STATENGENERAAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2z9dddx (statement of Mrs. Duthler (VVD)).
166. Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 250-51. If a case were to proceed to the
Dutch Supreme Court, however, proceedings there would be in Dutch. Annette Scholten, An
International Netherlands Commercial Court?, TRANSNAT’L NOTES (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y4p6k553.
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will not be at the expense of the capacity and resources for the other cases
of the judiciary.”167 Another Member of Parliament (MP) worried that the
NCC’s high fees would interfere with the right, guaranteed by Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, that “entitles everyone to a
fair and public hearing of their case within a reasonable period of time
before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”168 Yet
another MP expressed concerns about how the NCC’s innovations would
be distributed throughout the rest of the judiciary. Noting that judges are
overworked and the judicial system is underfunded, the MP described the
NCC as “a gold [band-aid], while for other wounds [band-aids] are not even
available . . . .”169 To address this concern, the MP asked the Ministry to
promise that excess fees from the NCC would “go back to the general
resources of the Council for the Judiciary, in order to cover the deficits
there. Let the strongest shoulders carry the heaviest loads.”170
The Minister of Justice’s responses to these public-minded concerns
shifted the focus to differences between courts and arbitration. He argued
that while the NCC is more expensive than other Dutch courts, the real
comparator should be arbitration—and the NCC is less expensive than
arbitration.171
Despite the MPs’ concerns, the legislation passed in December 2018.172
On January 1, 2019, the Dutch launched the Netherlands Commercial
Court.173 Some commenters seem confident that if the court is deemed a
success, that “will lead to a call to implement these adjustments in other
cases as well.”174 Thus far, the NCC has rendered eight judgments in seven
cases and has no pending hearings, according to the court website.175
167. Behandeling Engelstalige rechtspraak bij internationale handelskamers, supra note 165 (statement of
Mrs. Wezel (SP), on behalf of the political groups of the SP, GroenLinks (the Green Party), 50PLUS
and the Party for the Animals); see also id. (statement of Mrs. Bikker (Christian Union)) (expressing
concerns about “the financing of this court, the court fees and the position of small and medium-sized
businesses, in particular the smaller entrepreneur, who is being [left] behind.”).
168. Id. (statement of Mrs. Duthler (VVD)).
169. Behandeling Engelstalige rechtspraak bij internationale handelskamers, supra note 165 (statement of
Mrs. Andriessen (D66)).
170. Id.
171. Verslag van de plenaire vergadering van dinsdag 4 december 2018, EERSTE KAMER DER STATENGENERAAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y6gp25fv (statement of Minister Dekker) (“The NCC
is indeed more expensive than normal proceedings before the Dutch government, but usually cheaper
than arbitration or proceedings before a foreign government, due to all kinds of additional costs of
translation and travel and accommodation costs abroad.”).
172. Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC) Legislation Approved by Senate, DE RECHTSPRAAK (Dec. 11,
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2vq7jd2.
173. Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC): Who We Are, DE RECHTSPRAAK,
https://tinyurl.com/y52pfgen (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
174. Eddy Bauw, Commercial Litigation in Europe in Transformation: The Case of the Netherlands
Commercial Court, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 15, 23 (2019).
175. Netherlands Commercial Court, Judgments, DE RECHTSPRAAK, https://tinyurl.com/y2vdjkb4
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3. Singapore
Singapore, a small island country with limited natural resources, has built
an “outward-looking economy” that seeks to import globalized business.176
From the 1960s to the 1990s, it became “a leading manufacturing,
transportation, shipping and financial services center in the global economy
of the early twenty-first century.”177 Since then, Singapore has continued
those efforts and extended them into the realm of international commercial
dispute resolution, opening the Singapore International Arbitration Center
in 1991, an international mediation center in 2014, and the SICC in 2015.178
The establishment of the SICC was remarkably quick and devoid of
controversy. The Chief Justice of Singapore first suggested the idea in
2013.179 A committee of judges and “eminent international and local lawyers
and legal experts” was then convened to study the idea, yielding a report180
in November 2013 that was subject to a “public consultation” in December
2013 and January 2014. The court’s framework was finalized by the end of
2014, allowing the court to open on January 5, 2015.181
The SICC’s stated purpose is “to enhance [Singapore’s] status as a
leading forum for legal services and commercial dispute resolution” and to
become “an Asian dispute resolution hub catering to international disputes
with an Asian connection.”182
The SICC identifies itself as a court. Its website suggests that parties
might prefer it to arbitration to avoid five potential problems:

(last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
176. Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception That Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73, 77 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds.,
2008).
177. Id.
178. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 247; Erie, supra note 104, at 263.
179. Establishment of the SICC, S ING. INT’L COM. CT., https://tinyurl.com/y5g6uhl5 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
180. ANG CHENG HOCK ET AL., SING. INT’L COM. CT. COMM., REPORT OF THE SINGAPORE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE (2013), https://tinyurl.com/y44bfauq
[hereinafter SICC Committee Report].
181. Establishment of the SICC, supra note 179.
182. SICC Committee Report, supra note 180, at 5; Michael Hwang, Commercial Courts and
International Arbitration – Competitors or Partners?, 31 ARB. INT’L 193, 196 (2015).
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1. over-formalization of, delay in, and rising costs of arbitration;
2. concerns about the legitimacy of and ethical issues in
arbitration;
3. the lack of consistency of decisions and absence of developed
jurisprudence;
4. the absence of appeals; and
5. the inability to join third parties to the arbitration.183
Accordingly, the SICC touts itself as providing speedy, relatively
informal, low cost dispute resolution. Its judges follow an ethics code. The
SICC follows the common law tradition and it aspires to develop
transnational commercial law.184 The court also has broad power to join
third parties and subpoena witnesses.185
In its institutional design, however, the SICC borrows extensively from
arbitration.186 Proceedings are in English (one of Singapore’s official
languages). The court has jurisdiction over international commercial
disputes if the parties consent to jurisdiction or if the case is referred by
Singapore courts; no connection to Singapore is required.187 The court
offers flexible procedures and allows the parties to opt out of default
procedural rules. Parties need not seek court leave to serve parties
extraterritorially if the defendant is located abroad.188 Parties can waive the
right to appeal. Subject to court approval, they can agree to keep the case
confidential.189 Whether parties may designate non-state law to govern their

183. Establishment of the SICC, supra note 179.
184. Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: Issues, Challenges, and Possible
Solutions, 108 A M. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 219, 234 (2014).
185. “[T]he SICC has a broad and discretionary mandate to join non-consenting parties to its
proceedings.” Stamboulakis & Crook, supra note 106, at 98.
186. The court is explicit in its intention to bring together court and arbitration features. See, e.g.,
Sundaresh Menon, Chief Just. of the Sup. Ct. of Sing., Singapore International Chamber of Commerce
Distinguished Speaker Series: The Rule of Law and the SICC (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yx8h5j7c.
187. Man Yip, The Singapore International Commercial Court: The Future of Litigation?, 12 ERASMUS L.
REV. 82, 86 (2015) (“[T]he SICC framework implicitly recognises that the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is not as ‘exorbitant’ as traditionally perceived to be and that parties’ choice alone is a
sufficient basis to establish existence of jurisdiction . . . .”).
188. Id. at 86-87.
189. Norton Rose Fulbright, The Singapore International Commercial Court: A Challenge to Arbitration?,
7 BANKING & FIN. DISP. REV. 7 (2015), https://tinyurl.com/y3bgyj6c. Beginning in early opinions,
the SICC urged careful balancing of “both the public interest of open justice and the countervailing
private interest of safeguarding confidential information” in order to “mak[e] the SICC a pragmatic,
flexible and attractive forum for dispute resolution.” Hwee Hwee Teh & Justin Yeo, Commentary: The
Singapore International Commercial Court in Action: Illustrations from the First Case, SING. INT’L COM. CT. ¶
47 (July 21, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yy9lxn2s (discussing BCBC Sing. Pte Ltd. v. PT Bayan
Resources, [2016] SGHC(I) (Sing.), https://tinyurl.com/y3r7pdst).
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contracts is still untested,190 but the SICC Rules provide that foreign law
may be proved as a fact.191
Nearly half the court’s judges are “international” judges, highly
respected arbitrators or former judges from other countries including the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan.192 As in
arbitration, parties may choose between filing an action before a single judge
or a panel of three judges.193 And whereas many courts require lawyers to
be admitted to the local bar, the SICC welcomes foreign lawyers and has
developed an ethics code for them.194
The SICC is one of the more successful arbitral courts thus far, in that
it has cases and is beginning to develop case law. Since the SICC was created
in 2015, it has rendered more than 70 judgments.195 Some have involved
high stakes; the first decision resolved a S$1.1 billion dispute (about US $800
million).196 The court has decided cases quickly, often within three months
of the hearing, and sometimes within 30 days.197
In 2018, the SICC celebrated the first case submitted as a result of a
forum-selection clause. (Other cases to date had been referred to the SICC
from the ordinary Singapore courts.) The court declared the case to be “a
landmark achievement” and “a strong testament to the trust and confidence
the wider legal community has in the Singapore judiciary.”198
190. See Yeo Tiong Min, Yong Pung How Chair Professor of Law, Sing. Mgmt. Univ., Choice of
Law for Contracts: The Hague Principles from a Singaporean and Asian Perspective ¶¶ 35-39 (May 18,
2017), https://cebcla.smu.edu.sg/sites/cebcla.smu.edu.sg/files/Paper2017.pdf (suggesting that the
SICC might recognize parties’ choice of non-state law, but that issue is unlikely to come up in practice).
191. Frequently Asked Questions, No. 19, SING. INT’L COM. CT., https://www.sicc.gov.sg/faqs (last
visited Feb. 13, 2021).
192. See Judges, SING. INT’L COM. CT., https://www.sicc.gov.sg/about-the-sicc/judges (last
visited Feb. 13, 2021).
193. Filing before a single judge costs S$3,300; before a three-judge panel, the price rises to
S$4,950. There are additional fees of similar amounts, payable by each party, for hearings, certification
of the exchange of evidence affidavits, trial, and interlocutory applications. SICC RULES, order 110, r.
47(2) (fees ranging from S$1,100 to S$3,500 for single judge actions and from S$2,750 to S$10,500 for
three-judge panels). The SICC follows the English rule on costs. “The unsuccessful party . . . must pay
the reasonable costs of the application or proceedings to the successful party, unless the Court orders
otherwise.” SICC RULES, order 110, r. 46, https://tinyurl.com/y2mfbvzy.
194. SICC CODE OF ETHICS, https://tinyurl.com/yyf8hf66 (applicable to “every registered
foreign lawyer” before the SICC or the Court of Appeal, “when constituted to hear any relevant
appeal”).
195. See Judgments, SING. INT’L COM. CT., https://www.sicc.gov.sg/hearingsjudgments/judgments (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
196. BCBC Sing. Pte Ltd. v. PT Bayan Resources, [2016] SGHC(I) 01 (Sing.),
https://tinyurl.com/y3r7pdst; K.C. Vijayan, $1.1b Dispute is First Case Heard, STRAITS TIMES (Nov. 21,
2015), https://tinyurl.com/y2pdc7oh.
197. See Judgments, SICC, supra note 195; Rebecca LeBherz & Zoe Walker, The Singapore International
Court – Two Years On, KING & WOOD MALLESONS (May 29, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y58eg26h.
198. A Landmark First Case Filed in the Singapore International Commercial Court, SICC NEWS (Sing.
Int’l Com. Ct., Singapore), Apr. 2018, at 1, https://tinyurl.com/y2ukdjnp; Huo & Yip, supra note 105,
at 938.
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The SICC has also announced at least one influential opinion, B2C2 Ltd.
v. Quoine, a decision in a cryptocurrency dispute, written by Judge Simon
Thorley.199 In an opinion by Chief Judge Sundaresh Menon, the Singapore
Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part in 2020.200 The SICC
and Court of Appeal opinions have been widely cited, including by lawyers
in the United Kingdom advocating that UK courts should adopt their
reasoning.201 U.S. scholars have also commended the decision, although with
the caveat that it might not confront all the complexities of “smart
contracts” or transactional scripts.202
The Singapore court’s blurring of public and private adjudication does
not seem to have been put to the ultimate test, however. Thus far, the SICC
does not seem to have considered any cases in which the government or
government-affiliated entities have been a party. Such a case would test the
limits of the SICC’s neutrality. Singapore courts have been known to favor
the government in other contexts.203 If the SICC takes a more independent
stance in a government-related dispute, that will be the case it should
celebrate.
4. Dubai
The Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) establishes a
business-friendly legal jurisdiction that insulates foreign companies from
local regulations influenced by Islamic law that might otherwise govern
Dubai commerce. The UK lawyers who designed the DIFC court modeled
it on a combination of the London Commercial Court and international
arbitration.204

199. B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd, [2019] SGHC(I) 03 (Sing.); Simon Thorley QC, BRICK COURT
CHAMBERS, https://www.brickcourt.co.uk/our-people/profile/simon-thorley-qc (last visited Feb. 13,
2021) (Simon Thorley arbitrator bio); Judges, SICC, supra note 192 (SICC bio).
200. Quoine Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd, [2020] SGCA(I) 02 (Sing.).
201. UK JURISDICTION TASKFORCE, LEGAL STATEMENT ON CRYPTOASSETS AND S MART
CONTRACTS (2019) (“As far as we are aware, the proprietary status of cryptoassets specifically has not
yet been the subject of any authoritative decision in any common law jurisdiction. We find some
support, however, for our conclusion in a recent case in Singapore, B2C2 v Quoine. The judge accepted
(there being no argument to the contrary) that bitcoins could be the subject of a trust, and hence were
property. He observed that ‘cryptocurrencies have the fundamental characteristic of intangible property
as being an identifiable thing of value’ and that they met all of the requirements in National Provincial
Bank.”) (citing Quoine Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd, [2020] SGCA(I) 02 (Sing.)).
202. See, e.g., Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks, 105
MINN. L. REV. 319, 360 (2020) (concluding that the opinion “got it mostly right in context, but that its
reasons won’t scale” to broader questions raised by transactional scripts, commonly known as “smart
contracts”).
203. See Silverstein, supra note 176, at 80; JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW :
LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 85-86 (2012).
204. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 243.
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The court has jurisdiction over international commercial disputes if the
parties consent to jurisdiction; in 2011, the DIFC removed any requirement
that the case have a physical connection to the DIFC.205 But the court also
has jurisdiction over other DIFC-related disputes. The DIFC honors parties’
choice of law selections, including, possibly, if they select non-state law.206
Where parties have not designated the governing law, the background law is
local “DIFC law,” “the result of legislation and common law decisions.”207
The court offers one set of procedural rules modeled on the London
Commercial Court’s and a second set of alternative procedures modeled on
common arbitration rules for increased flexibility. Like the Dutch arbitral
court, the DIFC mimics the International Bar Association rules of evidence
for arbitration.208 Subject to court approval, parties can agree to keep the
case confidential.209 Like the Singapore arbitral court, the DIFC court
employs foreign judges, in this case some from the UAE but also from
England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, and Malaysia.210 On February 8,
2021, the Ruler of Dubai appointed two new British judges to the Court of
Appeal and the first female Emirati common law judge to the DIFC Court
of First Instance.211 This staffing represents a departure from ordinary
Dubai courts. In another departure that mimics arbitration, foreign
practitioners may practice in the DIFC courts if they are in good standing
in another jurisdiction.212 The DIFC courts have also developed their own
professional conduct code for all lawyers authorized to appear before
them.213
In a unique attempt to combine court and arbitration features, the DIFC
has an innovative approach to enforcement. It has recognized and enforced
English judgments as though they were UAE judgments, and entered into
205. Zain Al Abdin Sharar & Mohammed Al Khulaifi, The Courts in Qatar Financial Centre and Dubai
International Financial Centre: A Comparative Analysis, 46 H.K. L.J. 529, 545 (2016).
206. DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, art. 8, § 2(c), https://tinyurl.com/yys524k8.
207. Court Rules, DIFC CTS., https://www.difccourts.ae/difc-courts/rules (last visited Feb. 13,
2021) (“The DIFC Courts will apply the DIFC’s laws and regulations, all of which are listed under
Laws and Regulations, unless the parties explicitly agree that another law governs their dispute.”).
208. Erie, supra note 104, at 269.
209. Norton Rose Fulbright, supra note 189, at 7.
210. Judges, DIFC CTS., https://www.difccourts.ae/about/court-structure/judges (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021). Michael Hwang, the former Chief Justice of the DIFC court, is from Singapore.
211. Ruler of Dubai Appoints New Judges to the DIFC Courts, DIFC CTS . (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://tinyurl.com/y3oer3tg. The Chief Justice of the DIFC Courts explained that “[t]he DIFC
Courts serve the international business community by maintaining a world-class bench,” and expressed
pride in being “the first court in the world to appoint a female Emirate judge to a common law court.”
Id.
212. New Dispute Resolution Options in the DIFC Courts, CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP),
Oct. 21, 2012, at 1, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/dispute-resolution-options-difc-courts.
213. The Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners in the DIFC Courts, DIFC CTS. (Sept. 3,
2014), https://www.difccourts.ae/code-of-conduct/.
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various agreements with other international commercial courts to encourage
reciprocal recognitions and enforcement.214
Even more interestingly, the DIFC Courts also allow parties to convert
a DIFC court money judgment into an arbitral award at the DIFC-LCIA
Arbitration Centre (or any other arbitration center).215 This unusual process
would allow the winning party in a DIFC court proceeding to enforce the
resulting money judgment as an arbitral award, which is easier to enforce
internationally under the New York Convention.216
The DIFC courts also allow joinder or consolidation of “connected
contracts,” parties, and proceedings.217 These rules articulate a loose
standard for bringing in third parties who may be relevant to the case but
not parties to the contract that formed the basis for the dispute, and for
consolidating claims that might not arise out of that contract. For the court
to join a third party, it need not have independent territorial (or other)
jurisdiction over that third party.218 Parties before the DIFC courts cannot,
however, waive the right to appeal, and unusually, a non-party affected by
the court’s judgment may also exercise the right to appeal.219
Like the Singapore arbitral court, the DIFC court has developed a
relatively robust docket. The court has heard disputes based on a DIFC
forum selection clause.220 In 2016, the DIFC court decided 217 disputes
involving, in the aggregate, more than $500 million.221 That same year, 42%
of contracts drafted in English in the Middle East and North Africa chose
the DIFC as the seat for disputes.222 In 2019, DIFC Courts heard 952 cases
involving, in the aggregate, over $840 million.223 Over 70% of claims in the
214. See Erie, supra note 104, at 40.
215. Wilske, supra note 19, at 162-63; Marta Requejo Isidro, International Commercial Courts in the
Litigation Market (Max Planck Inst. Lux. for Procedural L. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 2019 (2),
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327166.
216. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
217. Walker, supra note 19, at 11; DIFC COURT RULES pt. 20.7, https://www.difccourts.ae/difccourts/rules/part-20 (“The Court may order a person to be added as a new party if: (1) it is desirable
to add the new party so that the Court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings; or (2)
there is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the matters in
dispute in the proceedings, and it is desirable to add the new party so that the Court can resolve that
issue.”).
218. Peter Wood, The DIFC Court of Appeal Confirms the DIFC Courts’ ‘Necessary or Proper Party’
Jurisdiction, LEXOLOGY (May 6, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y5h2fzbw; Nest Inv. Holding Leb. S.A.L.
v. Deloitte & Touche (M.E.), [2018] DIFC CA 011.
219. Walker, supra note 19, at 15.
220. See, e.g., Susie Abdel-Nabi & Nicholas Braganza, United Arab Emirates: Positive Clarification on
The Jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, MONDAQ (Aug. 22, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y25cm7jy.
221. Emmanuel Gaillard, Yas Banifatemi & Chloe Vialard, The International Chambers of the Paris
Courts and Their Innovative Rules of Procedure, SHEARMAN & STERLING (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yybal92e (discussing global trends).
222. Requejo, supra note 215, at 7.
223. DIFC Courts Cements Status as Jurisdiction of Choice for Regional Dispute Resolution, DUBAI INT’ L
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Court of First Instance arose from parties’ selection of the DIFC Courts as
their chosen forum.224
The DIFC court has a high settlement rate, which some see as a sign
that “the court is doing its job” and creating “certainty and trust.”225 In suits
involving the government, however, the DIFC courts’ record is mixed. They
have ruled against quasi-government corporations, but they have favored
the government in all cases involving the DIFC Authority.226
5. Cayman Islands
In his study of offshore tax havens, Will Moon has described the
offshore business courts established in the past decade in Bermuda, the
British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands as resembling arbitration.227
The Cayman Islands Financial Services Division (FSD) court is
representative, and an important example because of historic controversies
over the secrecy of its dockets.
The FSD is one of the Cayman Islands’ four specialty courts. Its subject
matter jurisdiction covers proceedings relating to mutual funds, contracts,
Cayman Islands Companies Law, bankruptcy, and enforcement of foreign
judgments and arbitration awards, among other topics.228 For some of these
categories, the amount in controversy must exceed CI$1 million
(approximately US$1.2 million in February 2021). While this subject-matter
requirement seems to restrict cases to those involving Cayman Islands
registered companies, it should be remembered that the Cayman Islands is
a magnet incorporation jurisdiction for companies whose principals,
employees, and places of business are located elsewhere.229 As a result, FSD
disputes—whether they involve contracts, bankruptcy, or other issues—are
often transnational.230
FIN. CTR. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/yy7wubt6.
224. Id.
225. JAYANTH A. KRISHNAN, THE STORY OF THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CENTRE COURTS: A RETROSPECTIVE 26, 68 (2018). According to a local practitioner interviewed in
2017, “[o]pportunities for investment and growth here [in the litigation business in Dubai] are greater
now than ever, particularly in IP and litigation.” Alex Taylor, Dubai: The Gateway to the Middle East for
International Firms, THE LAW. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y4ex4eze.
226. Erie, supra note 104, at 275.
227. Moon, supra note 18, at 1406-08, 1440-41.
228. FINANCIAL SERVICES DIVISION GUIDE GRAND COURT CAYMAN ISLANDS SECOND
EDITION 12 (2015), https://tinyurl.com/y2y8vcht [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES GUIDE].
229. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2019) (“[A] very
high percentage of corporate entities registered in offshore financial havens are ‘exempted’ or
‘excepted’ entities under the laws of those jurisdictions, formed for the express purpose of doing
business outside of those jurisdictions.”).
230. “The procedures of the FSD have been developed to meet the needs of large scale and
complex litigation which require courts to respond to the need for urgent applications often with an
international dimension.” Cayman Islands, STANDING INT’L F. OF COM. CTS.,
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The FSD is a domestic court that was designed to closely resemble the
London Commercial Court. The Cayman Islands is a common law
jurisdiction; the Privy Council in London is its highest court of appeal.231
Proceedings are in English. Foreign lawyers are not allowed to practice
before the courts, except if accompanied by a local lawyer.232 The Cayman
Islands Code of Conduct governs lawyers appearing before the court.233
The court’s judges are business law experts, but not necessarily Cayman
nationals.234 The former Chief Justice of Bermuda is an FSD judge,235 as is
a Malaysian-born British national and a Turks and Caicos Belonger who was
previously a judge in that country.236
The FSD’s procedures are modeled after the London Commercial
Court’s, and are responsive to users’ needs in the aggregate, even if not more
than usual in a particular court proceeding. Like many arbitral courts, an elite
group of lawyers designed the procedures.237 A User’s Committee continues
to meet regularly to review “developments and the operation of the FSD.”238
As a result, the procedures tend to mimic English common law and also
reflect the interest of the firms’ corporate clients. For possible disputes
where such clients might be on both sides of the “v,” this system may yield
fair and efficient proceedings. But in other contexts, the results may be more
slanted.239
https://tinyurl.com/y2stokq3 (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); see also Ian Huskisson et al., Litigation &
Dispute Resolution 2019: Cayman Islands, GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://tinyurl.com/y2p3kuaa (last
visited Feb. 13, 2021) (“A very large part of the business of the Cayman Islands courts is cross-border
in nature.”).
231. Its laws and procedures are available only with paid registration, but the FSD publishes a
Users’ Guide modeled on the London Commercial Court Guide. FINANCIAL SERVICES GUIDE, supra
note 228.
232. Hector Robinson & Peter Hayden, Litigation and Enforcement in the Cayman Islands: Overview,
THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L. (Aug. 1, 2014).
233.
CODE
OF
CONDUCT
FOR
CAYMAN
ISLANDS
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW,
https://tinyurl.com/yxjl5qys.
234. The current FSD judges are not Cayman Islands natives or citizens. The designation of
“foreignness” is complicated, however, because the Cayman Islands (like Bermuda and the BVI) is a
British Overseas Territory, and the small size of the population may make it necessary to look broadly
for judges. Cf. Rosalind Dixon & Vicki Jackson, Hybrid Constitutional Courts: Foreign Judges on National
Constitutional Courts, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 327 (2019).
235. Judges: Hon. Ian Kawaley, CAYMAN IS. JUD. ADMIN., https://tinyurl.com/y3y7ukzl (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
236. Judges: Hon. Richard N. Williams, CAYMAN IS. JUD. ADMIN., https://tinyurl.com/y3y7ukzl
(last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
237. Moon, supra note 18, at 1407.
238. Cayman Islands, supra note 230.
239. For example, a Cayman Islands procedural rule requires a shareholder to seek leave from the
court before filing a derivative action. This rule severely limits potential shareholder derivative litigation
that would otherwise be available in jurisdictions like Delaware—a rule that arguably favors corporate
interests over shareholders’. See Mathias M. Siems, Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Actions
as a Global Phenomenon, in COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING A CCESS TO JUSTICE AND
RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? (Stefan Wrbka et al. eds., 2012).
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The FSD may be attractive to some litigants because of the perceived
potential for sealing cases. Confidential or proprietary information filed with
offshore courts such as the FSD can be quite valuable, and therefore the
content of the FSD’s court files is often “the subject both of pre-emptive
applications for sealing and subsequent applications … for general
access.”240
To determine whether to seal records in such circumstances, the FSD
adheres to open justice as “a fundamental principle of the common law.”241
The Cayman Islands Constitution requires that “[a]ll proceedings instituted
in any court for the determination of the existence of extent of any civil
right or obligation, including announcements of the decision of the court,
shall be public.”242 This requirement does not directly apply to certain ex
parte matters, such as applications to authorize a settlement,243 but even in
such proceedings, the common law principle—tempered with limitations
based on “the interests of justice”—remains.244 In cases where records or
proceedings are sealed, the FSD has published opinions detailing the privacy
and publicity interests it has weighed in deciding to seal the records.245
There has been some controversy over allegedly excessive use of sealing
orders. According to a 2018 report by journalist David Marchant, after a
history of sealing fewer than 10% of cases in the first seven years of its
existence, the rate of sealing cases went from 15% in 2017 to 33% in the
first half of 2018, with 55% sealed in the 68 days between May 17 and July
23, 2018.246 The spike seems to have followed a new Practice Direction that
allowed sealing winding-up petitions, “a legal notice issued by a creditor like
[a government tax authority] with the intention of forcing a company into
[fore]closure.”247 According to Marchant’s most recent analysis of available
240. Bernadette Carey, Open Book or Locked Vault? Access to Court Documents in the Cayman Islands,
CONYERS, DILL & PEARMAN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6ezjgbw.
241. In the Matter of the Companies Law (2013 Revision) and in the Matter of the SPhinX Group of Companies
(in Official Liquidation) as Consolidated by Order of the Grand Court dated 6 June 2007), Cause No. FSD: 16 of
2009 (ASJ) ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 2017) (Cayman Is.) [hereinafter SPhinX].
242. Cayman Islands Constitution Order 2009 sched. 2, § 7, https://tinyurl.com/ycaj5sax.
243. SPhinX, supra note 241, ¶ 8 (“[S]anction applications do not engage section 7 of the
Constitution because they do not require the Court to determine rights and obligations of the parties
in adversarial legal proceedings.”).
244. SPhinX, supra note 241, ¶ 12.
245. See, e.g., id.; In the Matter of an Application for Leave to Seek Judicial Review and in the Matter of an
Application for a Confidentiality Order, Cause No. 30 of 2019 (May 29, 2019) (Cayman Is.); see also Jason
Wood et al., Confidentiality in Issuing Cayman Islands Proceedings, OFFSHORE LITIG. BLOG (June 5, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/ybzfyxsb.
246. Moon, supra note 18, at 40 (citing David Marchant, Cayman Court Secrecy on the Rise: 55% of
Recent Financial Cases are Sealed, OFFSHORE ALERT (Aug. 6, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y5xurxgm).
247. Simon Renshaw, What is a Winding Up Petition or Order from Creditors like HMRC?,
COMPANYDEBT, https://www.companydebt.com/winding-up-petitions/ (last updated Dec. 27,
2020).
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statistics, in the first seven months of 2019, one third of cases were
sealed.248
The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, however, disputed the 2018
report. The Chief Justice explained that the sealed orders generally were
temporary and “made only for good reason.”249 Specifically, he argued that
“most of the cases not currently public are winding-up petitions, which are
subject to a ‘special procedure’ that delays their publication,” usually for 72
hours, “so a judge can assess the petition’s merit.”250 The court also
defended the practice of sealing winding-up petitions because publicizing
such decisions, even if they are dismissed as non-meritorious, can “cause
irreparable harm” to a company’s reputation.251 Law firms also favored
sealing winding-up petitions.252
As for judicial opinions and decisions not under seal, the FSD appears
to have made improvements to the accessibility of opinions even since the
time that the research for this Article began. For “full and unlimited access”
to the Cayman Islands Law Reports, registered users must pay an annual fee
of CI$350/US$420.253 But visual access to reported and unreported
opinions—including those cited in this Article—are now available by
clicking through the Judgments portion of the website, to Unreported
Judgments, then Access Public Registers.254

IV.

TESTING THE BOUNDARIES

Arbitral courts are the vanguard of international commercial dispute
resolution institutional design. By borrowing from “the best” of both
litigation and arbitration, Hiro Aragaki has explained, courts like the arbitral
court in Singapore reject “an either/or choice between public and private
adjudication; instead, they think of dispute resolution holistically, all the
248. David Marchant, Cayman Secrecy: 1/3 of Business Court Cases in 2019 Sealed from Public View,
OFFSHORE ALERT (Aug. 11, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y42vmjh5.
249. Ken Silva, More Court Records Being Kept Secret, CAYMAN COMPASS (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.caymancompass.com/2018/08/08/report-more-court-records-being-kept-secret/.
250. Id. A winding up petition “is a legal notice issued by a creditor like [a government tax
authority] with the intention of forcing a company into [fore]closure.” Renshaw, supra note 247.
Because it can result in freezing all of a company’s assets, such petitions are “amongst the most serious
pieces of legal action any limited company can face.” Id.
251. Silva, supra note 249.
252. Jessica Williams & William Peake, New Cayman Islands Grand Court Practice Direction Aims to
Prevent Premature Publication of Winding Up Petitions, HARNEYS: OFFSHORE LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y4bcspz2.
253. Judgments, CAYMAN IS. JUD. A DMIN., https://www.judicial.ky/judgments (last visited Feb.
13, 2021); Financial Services Division, CAYMAN IS. JUD. A DMIN., https://www.judicial.ky/courts/grandcourt/financial-services-division (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
254. Judgments, CAYMAN IS. JUD. A DMIN., https://www.judicial.ky/judgments (last visited Feb.
13, 2021).
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while borrowing one device from one process and glomming it on to
another without so much as an afterthought.”255
This Part provides the afterthought, and an accompanying critique.
Arbitral courts and their designers may be throwing traditional distinctions
to the wind. But can arbitral courts coherently reject the public/private
distinctions in all senses? While there is a flexibility in the distinction
between public and private adjudication in many respects,256 this Part
contends that there are and should be limits because arbitral courts wield
the power of the state and relatedly because they have the potential to
declare and develop law.
This Part identifies three ways in which arbitral courts blur the
public/private distinction, tracking the core fundamentals of courts
discussed in Part II: the hybrid sources of arbitral courts’ authority and
legitimacy, public access vs. confidentiality, and the role of decisionmakers.
It argues for maintaining some boundaries by keeping arbitral courts’
authority consistent with its basis for legitimacy, and by keeping arbitral
courts transparent and open. Arbitral court judges will be key to any efforts
to do this.
First, there should be consistency between a court’s claim to legitimacy
and its jurisdictional reach. If a court claims legitimacy based on the consent
of the parties before it, then in theory its jurisdiction should be so limited,
just as an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction would be. That consent should not
justify the court reaching beyond what would otherwise be the limits of its
jurisdiction as it applies to parties and disputes beyond what the consenting
parties’ agreement. Second, courts are public institutions—arms of the state.
When courts become confidential or entrust the parties with questions of
confidentiality, they cross a line that is difficult to justify and will
compromise courts’ ability to be effective in dispute resolution over the long
term and in law making.257 Third, arbitral courts’ hybrid nature is also
apparent in arbitral court judges, who may have experience as both judges
and arbitrators and whose incentive structures combine aspects of both
arbitrators’ and judges’. If arbitral courts are to make and develop law—one
unique function that courts can offer258—then the judicial ethos should take
255. Aragaki, supra note 16, at 564-65.
256. See supra Part II.
257. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 157 (discussing functions of courts in democracies beyond dispute
resolution and law making); Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 4
(2008) (discussing courts’ additional functions in authoritarian states).
258. Most arbitral courts are common law courts that make common law (even those, like the
DIFC court, that are not located in common law countries or within a common law tradition). Courts
in civil law countries, like the arbitral court in the Netherlands, also develop law, but in a different way.
See Jan Komárek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
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precedence over any countervailing arbitrator ethos, to the extent that those
conflict.

A. Legitimacy, Jurisdiction, and Enforceability
As discussed in Part II, a central distinction between courts and arbitral
tribunals is the source of their authority and legitimacy.259 For any given
case, an arbitral tribunal’s authority comes from—and is limited by—the
parties’ consent to jurisdiction through their arbitration clause. The arbitral
tribunal’s decision is ultimately enforced by the state according to the scope
of this agreement. This limited authority supports arbitration’s legitimacy,
which is buttressed by an international structure of support built by
international treaties, national courts, and private interests. Well respected
decision-makers (arbitrators) also lend sociological legitimacy because of
who they are, how they are chosen, and how they decide.
Courts generally have different sources of authority and sociological
legitimacy—principally from the state. In democracies, courts may have
democratic legitimacy and legal legitimacy.260 Their decisions can build
internal legitimacy by being well reasoned and following existing law.261 In
non-democratic states, courts may be able to build some of this internal
legitimacy but the state and its courts require a source of legitimacy to take
the place of democratic legitimacy. One source of any state’s legitimacy can
be its courts—and indeed, arbitral courts, themselves—if they conduct
themselves in a way that appears legally sound, fair, and independent.
That is, the legitimacy of courts and their host states are bound up with
each other. Courts, especially in non-democratic states, can lend legitimacy
to the state as opposed to the other way around. Political scientists have
documented that authoritarian regimes “need to portray themselves as
respectful of the rule of law to prolong their grip on power” domestically
to make up for their otherwise “questionable legitimacy.”262 From an
international perspective, an independent judiciary is thought to project an
image of a reliable economic climate and foster investment and trade.263
149 (2013).
259. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
260. This statement vastly oversimplifies. See FALLON, supra note 44, at 156, 160.
261. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001).
262. Ratna Rueban Balasubramaniam, Judicial Politics in Authoritarian Regimes, 59 U. TORONTO L.J.
405 (2009).
263. Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 A NN. REV. L. & SOC. SCIENCE
281, 286 (2014). Some studies suggest that international arbitration also lends legitimacy to
authoritarian regimes. See Mark Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States,
39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2014).
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Authoritarian governments seeking to cultivate independent judiciaries,
however, can find themselves in a circular bind. The courts may potentially
seek to limit the regime’s power; if they do, then “[the] authoritarian regime
must find ways to limit judicial power.”264 But the regime needs to limit
judicial power “without formally eviscerating judicial autonomy, since such
formal evisceration compromises the regime’s desire to project . . . legal
legitimacy for its actions.”265 Sometimes that cycle leads to more rule of law
reforms, as authoritarian regimes seek to reestablish legal legitimacy in the
face of having compromised judicial power, in order “to restore investor
confidence in the government’s commitment to the rule of law.”266 But
other studies suggest that “many regimes have figured out how to use law
as an instrument of social control over political critics without appearing to
compromise formal judicial independence.”267
Moreover, although courts may be in a position to limit a regime’s
power, “the potential of courts to live to fight another day as protectors of
the rule of law (perhaps when conditions grow less authoritarian) may
ultimately depend upon their ability to refrain from challenging the regime,
especially when the latter’s core interests are at stake.”268 In other words,
courts and judges may pick their battles with the regime—and not check the
regime’s power at every turn—because “going too far may ultimately result”
in the regime restricting the judiciary’s power or “in a loss of legitimacy for
the judiciary, as judicial independence may come under direct fire that will
produce a loss of public confidence in the courts.”269 Thus “[e]ven rule-oflaw-minded judges must be wary of this problem and may have to try to
advance the rule of law in a face-saving way, sending a message to the regime
that its actions are unacceptable without seeming to threaten its core
interests directly.”270 Doing so may require adept needle threading.
Arbitral courts in non-democratic states seem poised to take on this
paradoxical role. These jurisdictions are trying to encourage trust and
investment by establishing reliable courts—but if the courts challenge the
state’s power, that might result in the state rejecting the courts’ power.
Arbitral courts may face incentives to “pick their battles” to avoid
“excessive” confrontations with the state.
Arbitral courts present an unusual confluence of these reinforcing
power sources because they can claim legitimacy not just as arms of the
264. Balasubramaniam, supra note 262, at 405.
265. Id. at 406.
266. Id. at 409.
267. Id. at 410.
268. Id. at 411 (describing Martin Shapiro’s view).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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state but also based on parallels to arbitration. That is, they have a two
potential sets of sources of legitimacy and power: courts’ bases, including
the state’s sovereign authority, and arbitration’s bases (the parties’ consent,
the support of an international network of states, and the virtues of the
arbitrators). Like arbitration, arbitral courts seem legitimate because parties
have chosen to have their disputes adjudicated there and because of the
status and reputation of the decision-makers.271 For decades now, it has
become commonplace that courts can adjudicate disputes based on forum
selection clauses even if the parties and the dispute have no ties to the
forum.272 Parties can consent to jurisdiction in courts just like they can in
arbitration, thereby giving the court or arbitral tribunal jurisdiction over a
set of parties and a set of disputes that they would not otherwise have. The
well-respected judges add an additional layer of legitimacy.
When parties consent to jurisdiction, it might seem logical that arbitral
courts, like arbitration, would limit their jurisdiction to whatever the parties
chose to submit to them. But this is not usually the assumption because
arbitral courts also have the authority of the state. Once parties have
consented to a court’s jurisdiction, the court typically exercises the full force
of its powers—including the power to issue subpoenas and injunctive relief,
to consolidate cases not subject to the parties’ forum agreement, to join
non-consenting third parties,273 and to establish law that will be binding on
future parties. Unlike what typically happens in arbitration, the parties’
consent does not limit the court’s jurisdiction to the parties who have
consented. That is, consent-based court jurisdiction results in cases where
courts can issue subpoenas to third parties, join third parties, and otherwise
consolidate cases—even when there is no other territorial basis, beyond the
presence of the consenting parties, for the court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, part
271. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 221 (“The arbitral order benefits from, and
actively harnesses, the functional logic of delegation-as-authorization. In the commercial law of the
most important legal systems in the world, the contracts—a placeholder for the sanctity of party
autonomy—is a privileged source of legitimization of the judge.”).
272. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2015); John Coyle & Katherine
Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum Selection Clauses, 96 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (noting this
general rule and exceptions).
273. The SICC’s joinder rules are particularly expansive. Once the SICC has jurisdiction over a
case because two contracting parties consented to have the SICC hear their contractual disputes, the
court has the full power of the state to include in the proceedings additional parties who may not have
consented. Stamboulakis & Crook, supra note 106. Indeed, the SICC rules grant the court authority to
join non-consenting parties, including naming them as additional plaintiffs or defendants, even if, apart
from this joinder, they have no other connection to Singapore and Singapore would otherwise lack
judicial jurisdiction over them. Id. “[T]he only limitation to joinder of third parties in the SICC is a nonmandatory consideration [in O 110, r. 9(3)] of whether there is an ‘international and commercial
character’ to the claims against the third party or the third party’s relationship with the original parties.”
Id. at 100. Such joinder is not typically available in arbitration; the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is set—
and limited—by the scope of the parties’ agreement.
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of the courts’ attractiveness as a forum is that they can bind third parties,
adjudicate some kinds of cases (like business torts) that might not be able
to be subject to arbitration,274 and develop generally applicable law.275
This result is at best awkward, and at worst illegitimate, especially in
cases where the arbitral court joins a third party over whom it has no other
basis for exercising jurisdiction. It is unclear how often this extension of
jurisdiction would happen276 or whether it would be made public if it did
occur.
The point, however, is that the questions of jurisdiction over third
parties test the boundary between the powers and legitimacy of the court
acting as a public or private dispute resolution forum. Arbitral courts
suggest that the public/private boundary may be shifting in international
commercial disputes (in courts or arbitration), to one defined by the line
between authority based on parties’ consent and authority based on state
sovereignty in courts with compulsory jurisdiction. Arbitral courts are trying
both to straddle that line and to circumvent it.
State sovereignty alone, however, does not establish judicial jurisdiction
over everyone everywhere. Nor does it establish judicial legitimacy, especially
when states seek to draw legitimacy from the strength of their judicial
institutions.277 This criticism applies to the arbitral court in Delaware, for
example, which sought to base its legitimacy on the strength of the Delaware
judiciary, and relied on that basis as sufficient even if the public nature of
the court—and the accompanying public access and oversight and other
democratic safeguards—were removed. In non-democratic states, the risks
seem more severe. There, the pedigree of the arbitral court judges and the
arbitration-like (and common law) features of the arbitral courts are
intended to lend legitimacy and credibility to the state as well as the courts.
But it is circular to have courts’ consent-based legitimacy support the state’s
sovereign legitimacy, while also allowing the state’s power to extend the
court’s power beyond its original source: the parties’ consent.
Arbitral courts thus might do the converse of what Daniel Markovits
criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court and similar arbitration enthusiasts of
doing: trying to have it “both ways.”278 Arbitral courts seek to be like
arbitration and act as a contractual gap-filler when it comes to resting their
authority on the parties’ consent (even without other sovereign or territorial

274. See Yip, supra note 187, at 83.
275. Joshua Karton, Sectoral Fragmentation in Transnational Contract Law, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 142,
175 (2019); Lord Cwmgiedd, supra note 21.
276. Stamboulakis & Crook, supra note 106, at 101 (predicting the SICC will be “exceedingly
cautious” in exercising this jurisdiction).
277. See Moustafa, supra note 263, at 287.
278. See Markovits, supra note 12, at 434.
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claims to jurisdiction), but to be like a court—with the full sovereign power
of the state—once some basis for jurisdiction has been established.
Arbitral courts’ power, especially in common law jurisdictions, is not
limited by considerations of whether the court’s jurisdiction was granted
solely by the parties’ consent (e.g., in a case with no other ties to the forum).
This breadth of jurisdiction is not shocking. Courts in New York and
London have been exerting such power for decades. But the internal
inconsistency should be flagged. Sociologically it may be harder to establish
and maintain the legitimacy of this practice in smaller, newer, and less liberal
and democratic jurisdictions. This is not to say that the state’s power, e.g., to
make law through common law courts, is inherently illegitimate if the source
of the court’s jurisdiction over a particular case derives exclusively from the
parties’ consent. Rather, there is a tension that has heretofore gone
unnoticed and that may be strained if the state is relying on the court to lend
it legitimacy instead of the other way around.
The same limits echo in the area of enforcement. One of the most often
cited reasons for choosing arbitration over litigation is the easy
enforceability of arbitral awards around the world. But this distinction could
erode over time. Based on a trio of treaties, the difference between easy
enforceability (traditionally associated with arbitral awards) and stricter
scrutiny (traditionally associated with enforcing court judgments) may
ultimately depend on whether the parties have consented to the forum’s
jurisdiction—not whether that forum was an arbitral tribunal or a court.279
Under this framework, it could be consent, or its absence, that one day
distinguishes between ready international legitimacy and suspicion—not the
difference between an arbitral tribunal and a court. If that becomes the
norm over time, that may further weaken distinctions between arbitration
and litigation in transnational disputes more generally. But as is the case with
jurisdiction, if enforceability is made easier because parties consented to the
279. Three factors contribute to this shift. First, as of 2019, there are now international treaties
governing both the enforcement of arbitral awards and court judgments. The treaties allow easy
enforcement and minimal judicial review for awards and judgments based on tribunals that the parties
consented to—arbitral awards and judgments arising from disputes with exclusive forum selection
clauses. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30,
2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. The treaty that governs international enforcement of other kinds of foreign court
judgments allows more scrutiny, making enforcement more difficult. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 2, 2019,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=137. Second, in addition to this
international treaty regime, many states, including arbitral courts’ host states, are entering bilateral
agreements among themselves to promote ease of enforcement of court judgments. See, e.g., Erie, supra
note 104, at 243. Third, the arbitral courts themselves are experimenting with innovative approaches to
enforcement, as the DIFC court exemplifies. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text (discussing
DIFC court’s procedure allowing parties to convert DIFC court judgments into arbitral awards). These
are all relatively recent developments and their ultimate influence is yet to be tested.
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tribunal’s jurisdiction, then the scope of that consent should limit the scope
of that enforceability. That is, if the SICC, for example, were to use its
authority to join non-consenting third parties, over whom the court
otherwise would not have jurisdiction, then foreign courts should be reticent
to enforce that judgment against the third party.280
Arbitral courts rely not only on consent as an arbitration-borrowed basis
for legitimacy, but also on the personal legitimacy of the decision-makers
that signal the courts’ independence. Singapore, Dubai, and the Caymans
thus have hired judges from the United Kingdom and elsewhere to bring
with them the credentials, trustworthiness, and legitimacy that Delaware
sought to sell with its judges.281 As non-nationals, these foreign decisionmakers may quell potential concerns that these courts will exhibit bias in
favor of local parties or the local government. One purpose of hiring these
judges is to fill in legitimacy gaps created by the fact that the court’s authority
ultimately derives from the state in places where the state might otherwise
face a legitimacy deficit.282 This personnel-driven legitimacy once again
mirrors arbitration.
Arbitral courts also try to fend off some challenges to arbitration’s
legitimacy in other ways. For example, arbitral courts adopt their own ethical
rules, perhaps responding in part to perceived criticism that arbitration lacks
an applicable ethics code.283 Likewise, some observers question the legitimacy
of arbitration’s practice of letting parties choose arbitrators284 (although
others suggest that this practice increases the likelihood the losing party will
abide by the award285). Arbitral courts do not allow such a practice (although
in theory they could).
Whether this legitimacy, loaned by the chosen judges, will ultimately be
credible will depend on how cases play out in these courts. Our ability to
know how those cases play out will depend on arbitral courts’ commitment
to openness. If government or government-connected parties come before
arbitral courts, will the courts maintain their neutrality? Put simply, will
arbitral court judges be independent?

280. See Stamboulakis & Crook, supra note 106, at 98.
281. In Singapore, there was a preexisting trusted legal system in place before the founding of the
SICC. See Yip, supra note 187, at 82.
282. See, e.g., Mark Townsend, Head of Press Regulator Advised Kazakh Regime That Suppresses Free
Speech, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/rj7zak9.
283. See Code of Ethics, SICC, supra note 194; The Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners in
the DIFC Courts, supra note 213; Michelle Grando, Challenges to the Legitimacy of International Arbitration: A
Report from the 29th Annual ITA Workshop, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y68d3nye (discussing the need for ethical codes).
284. See, e.g., STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 25, at 226.
285. Id. at 224.
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The proof will be in the pudding. The ultimate test of the substantive
legitimacy may be in the outcomes of cases.286 These courts are still new
and must be watched for evidence. The DIFC courts, the oldest of the
examples, have had mixed results. As Matthew Erie has documented, DIFC
Courts have ruled in favor of the government bodies that have appeared
before them, but they have also ruled against quasi-government
corporations.287 This example yields both hope and skepticism—and a need
for transparency to be able to monitor arbitral court independence.

B. Publicity, Confidentiality, and Party Autonomy
The previous section addressed challenges to arbitral courts’ hybrid
approach to jurisdiction and legitimacy, and cautioned that the public’s
ability to evaluate that legitimacy will depend on how much of the arbitral
courts’ operations the public can see. If the working of arbitral courts is
kept completely confidential, that would of course undermine the
institutions’ legitimacy in its own right, as the Delaware experiment revealed.
Most arbitral courts, however, purport to be public institutions. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, however, arbitral courts give parties considerable choice and
control over procedural and evidentiary rules, with seemingly little court
oversight to ensure, for example, the fairness of the procedures. For many
such rules, one may not worry about this lack of oversight, assuming that
the parties’ need to agree will offer self-regulation. That is, the parties’
interests will be antagonistic towards each other and will balance each other
as they negotiate for procedures, obviating the need for judges to supervise
for fairness. For example, the plaintiff might want extensive discovery, the
defendant might want minimal discovery, and in contracting for procedure,
they might reach a compromise solution.
On confidentiality decisions, however, experience teaches that the
parties’ interests will likely be aligned in favor of confidentiality even though
public access—to courts’ proceedings, records, and decisions—would be in
the long-term institutional interest of the forum and of the law. Permitting
party control over decisions about confidentiality, therefore, may cross the
public/private divide.
In arbitration, parties are free to agree to keep their disputes—including
the proceedings and resulting decisions—confidential and private.
Confidentiality is not an inherent attribute of international commercial
arbitration, but it is an available option, and appropriately so.288 Moreover,
286. See Bookman & Noll, supra note 30, at 824.
287. Erie, supra note 104, at 275.
288. See, e.g., Marlon Meza-Salas, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration: Truth or
Fiction?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y7wfm9nf; KARTON, supra note
51, at 99.
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when confidentiality is on offer, parties often choose to keep their disputes
secret. Parties’ control over confidentiality is not particularly worrisome
insofar as the effect of the arbitration remains private and binding only on
the consenting parties, without legal impact for others. Indeed, the call for
more transparency in international commercial arbitration comes with its
increasingly influential role in global governance. Without that impact
beyond the parties, confidentiality between truly consenting parties may not
be concerning.
Courts, however, ordinarily limit opportunities for confidentiality of
regular proceedings and of judicial decisions, and courts and scholars alike
urge the importance of “open justice.”289 Even when the disputes involve
private parties arguing over private law issues, courts working “out of sight”
(like confidential arbitration) compromise both their legitimacy and their
ability to develop law in the public interest.290 Courts’ openness “sustains
judicial independence, legitimates public investments in the judiciary, and
offers routes to oversight when courts fail to live up to obligations to treat
disputants fairly.”291 Privatizing disputes risks “erod[ing] public confidence”
in courts; prevents “checks against both unfairness to some litigants . . .
behind closed doors and potentially corrupt practices by attorneys, judicial
officers, and litigants”; and “threatens to impede public awareness of the
substantive law.”292 The purpose of open justice, the UK Supreme Court
recently stated, “is not simply to deter impropriety or sloppiness by the judge
hearing the case. It is wider. It is to enable the public to understand and
scrutinise the justice system of which the courts are the administrators.”293
Open justice is necessary “to enable the public to understand how the justice
system works and why decisions are taken.”294
The pitfalls of trusting the openness of arbitral courts to the parties
have been demonstrated in the court context, for example, in the history of
the opioid litigation,295 as well as in international commercial arbitration,
where calls for more institutional transparency have run up against party

289. See supra notes 17, 43 and accompanying text.
290. Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 V ILL. L. REV. 771, 803 (2008).
291. Resnik, Contingency of Openness, supra note 36, at 1631-32.
292. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052,
3055-56 (2015).
293. Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd. v. Dring [2019] UKSC 38, [37] (appeal taken from EWCA
Civ.) (allowing a non-party access to discovery produced in an asbestos litigation that settled).
294. Id. [42]-[43].
295. Benjamin Lesser et al., How Judges Added to the Grim Toll of Opioids, REUTERS (June 25, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-judges/ (reporting on the
secrecy of early iterations of the opioid litigation when the parties agreed to keep the litigation
confidential); id. (quoting the judge as explaining, “This case was sealed because both sides agreed and
asked me to seal it”).
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preferences.296 Party control over confidentiality choices is a little like
defendant control over forum choices—the allocation of decision making
authority typically decides the outcome.297
The traditional distinction is that in arbitration, parties have
considerable control over procedures including questions of confidentiality,
whereas in courts, especially common law courts, the public has access to
the proceedings and decisions of the courts. This public/private division
has been eroding for some time, as detailed in Part II. Even before arbitral
courts, increased party autonomy over procedures had governed choice of
forum, choice of law, and procedural decisions over issues such as discovery.
But parties had not been given control over the public nature of court
proceedings should they occur.
Arbitral courts potentially upend that distinction. They are poised to
cross the line from judge control over confidentiality, with at least strong
presumptions against it, to party control over confidentiality decisions and
minimal judicial supervision, with presumptions favoring the parties’
preferences. Judges may still be the ultimate decision-makers, but they have
strong incentives to favor pleasing the parties. And party preferences are
likely to favor confidentiality.
Arbitral courts have put themselves in this position to cater to their
customers—i.e., potential parties to international disputes. Offering
confidentiality is a form of “forum selling,”298 a way to compete with
arbitration to attract parties to select the arbitral court in their forum
selection clause or otherwise choose the arbitral court for disputes.
The originators of the term “forum selling” suggested that the practice
was problematic when courts were selling themselves to plaintiffs with
unilateral control over forum choices, but not if parties were agreeing on a
forum in a forum selection clause.299 In that latter situation, the authors
assumed parties would choose the best courts for both parties (perhaps each
party’s second choice), and courts would be driven to provide quality
proceedings that would satisfy both sides.
But there are times when the parties’ interests conflict with those of the
court and the public. Josh Karton has demonstrated that transparency

296. See, e.g., KARTON, supra note 51 (collecting scholarship advocating increased transparency
and explaining the conflicts with party preferences); cf. Rogers, supra note 74, at 1303 (considering
different institutional interests in more transparency).
297. See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1093-94 (2015);
Bookman, Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, supra note 30, at 614.
298. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016).
299. Id. at 243 (“When sophisticated parties use forum-selection clauses to choose the forum in
their contracts, they have an incentive to choose a forum that provides unbiased, efficient adjudication
because doing so maximizes the value of their transaction.”).
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presents such a conflict in international commercial arbitration.300 The
institution needs transparency to sustain sociological and legal legitimacy. In
arbitral courts, these needs exist to an arguably even greater extent. Arbitral
courts are new, and therefore need to publicize what they are doing to
establish these different kinds of legitimacy. In democracies, open justice is
necessary to bolster judicial independence, legitimacy, and to allow for
public oversight with respect to cases and lawmaking more generally.301
Arbitral courts in non-democratic states have an even higher burden to
demonstrate to the public—and the world of commercial parties who might
choose to litigate their disputes there—that they are independent and follow
the law.302

C. The Decision Makers
A third dividing line between arbitration and litigation in courts is the
decision maker.
Studies of international commercial arbitrators303 depict them as private
citizens with a business service ethos; in deciding cases, they often focus on
commercial reasonableness, and are typically less concerned with creating a
legal rule that will have staying power for the next case than they are with
resolving the case for the parties who have hired them.304
Judges, like arbitrators, come in many stripes and their approaches to
decision making are far from monolithic.305 But again, generally, national
300. KARTON, supra note 51, at 98.
301. See supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.
302. One might wonder whether arbitral courts’ rules about confidentiality are constrained by
some higher order law. While the UK Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the principle of “open
justice,” it is not clear whether and how this rule will bind or persuade arbitral courts, even those in the
common law tradition. In the United States, the Third Circuit held that the Constitution enshrines a
similar principle, thwarting Delaware’s attempt to create a confidential arbitral court. But it probably
would have been possible for Delaware (or another interested state) to circumvent such a ruling, as
noted earlier. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. A revised statute could make confidentiality
available at the judge’s discretion, and then set (or allow judges to set) a low threshold for granting
confidentiality requests (perhaps even not requiring the request to be bilateral). Such an arrangement
might have satisfied the Third Circuit. It is also possible that another set of federal judges, especially
those appointed more recently, might agree with the dissent rather than the majority in Delaware
Coalition.
303. Not all arbitrators are created equal. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law without the Rule
of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761
(2015) (distinguishing between investor-state arbitrators and WTO trade adjudicators in terms of
nationality, professional background, legal expertise, diversity, status, and ideology); James Crawford,
The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit All?, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003 (2018). This Article focuses
on descriptions of international commercial arbitrators.
304. KARTON, supra note 51, at 90-91.
305. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 19495 (2009); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing
Commission, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 186 (1991).
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commercial court judges tend to be public servants rather than private
citizens, and conceive of themselves as such. Common law judges
traditionally aim to resolve cases with an eye towards creating a rule that will
be applicable and manageable in future cases rather than exclusively yielding
a result that satisfies the parties. Some judges have been accused of “forum
selling,” particularly in situations when plaintiffs have “a wide choice of
forum,” which creates incentives for the judges “to make the law more proplaintiff because plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff law
and procedures.”306
Like arbitral courts themselves, arbitral court judges can be something
of a hybrid between arbitrators and national court judges. Some arbitral
court judges are or were judges in other existing courts in the domestic
system; indeed, the Delaware arbitral court judges were simply Chancery
Court judges given additional responsibilities. The “international” judges at
the Singapore, Dubai, and Cayman Islands arbitral courts are well respected
former judges from the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions, although
some come from private practice or have experience as an international
arbitrator. At the Singapore and Dubai courts, there are a few civil law judges
in addition to a roster of well-regarded common-law judges. Many of these
international judges also sometimes serve as arbitrators.307
Like international commercial arbitrators, these judges are desirable
decision makers because they have expertise in relevant law, in decisionmaking, and in international commercial disputes.308 They are well respected
not just for their expertise but for their ethics and virtue.309 Because they are
not locals, they may offer more neutrality than typical judges, who might be
thought to be biased in favor of local parties.310 These individuals may
indeed be the key to arbitral courts’ success—and to their legitimacy.
But regardless of their nationality, like ordinary court judges, arbitral
court judges are structurally positioned within the architecture of the state.
They are paid by the state. They have been recruited by the state to jumpstart
these new institutions and may feel (virtuously) invested in the institutions’
success.
As a result, arbitral court judges have hybrid incentive structures that
are difficult to parse. Whereas judges, whether on domestic or international
courts, are often said to have a “systemic perspective” when adjudicating
cases, that perspective is often said to have “less importance in international
306. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 298, at 242.
307. Former Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin is a good example.
308. See Crawford, supra note 303, at 1006.
309. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 53.
310. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in American
Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 442 (2007).
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arbitration, which, [for the arbitrator], is essentially a service to the
parties.”311
How will this hybrid posture affect arbitral court judges’ behavior and
affect the relationship between the state and the arbitral court? How will
arbitral court judges perceive their role and the role of their new institution?
How will they perceive their loyalties—to the development of their home
law (e.g., English law) or forum law (e.g., Singapore law), to the resolution
of particular disputes, or to the furtherance of their institutions? And will
states that otherwise lack separation of powers and full judicial
independence construct and respect those ideals with respect to arbitral
courts?
Because neither arbitrators nor judges are monolithic groups, further
research interviewing these judges and investigating the answers to these
questions is important. For now, this Article’s modest task is to raise these
questions. The hybrid nature of the institution of the arbitral court makes
it unclear whether arbitral court judges will conceive of themselves more as
judges or arbitrators. Their attitudes will affect how they interpret law,
resolve cases, and decide procedural questions like whether to grant the
parties’ request for confidentiality. For arbitral courts in jurisdictions with
uncertain histories of judicial independence, it remains to be seen how the
state will interact with the judges and vice versa.
Finally, arbitral courts to date, unlike arbitration, do not allow parties to
choose their decision makers. Some may think this limit removes the
attraction of arbitration, as well as a key to its legitimacy—parties may be
more likely to accept a decision if they have a say in choosing who decides.
But others who question the legitimacy of a decision made by an adjudicator
chosen by the parties may argue that this omission makes arbitral courts all
the more authoritative.
In short, the hybridity of arbitral courts is epitomized in the hybridity
of arbitral court judges. It is still unclear what this unusual combination of
ingredients will yield. The future of arbitral courts, discussed in the next
Part, may rest largely on the shoulders of arbitral court judges and how they
choose to respond to—and resist—the institutional incentives handed to
them.

V.

THE FUTURE OF ARBITRAL COURTS

Thus far, this Article has documented the emergence of arbitral courts
around the world as a culmination of long trends in the convergence of
public and private adjudication. The previous Part argued that arbitral
311. Giorgio Sacerdoti, From Law Professor to International Adjudicator, in PRACTISING VIRTUE:
INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 204 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015).
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courts’ efforts to blur the boundaries between these two types of
adjudication should reveal the limits of convergence. Courts, as public
institutions, should have consistent articulations of legitimacy and
jurisdiction and should provide transparency and public access. If arbitral
courts establish and maintain legitimacy and transparency, they have
significant potential for international influence—not just in resolving
individual disputes, but in global governance and in their capacity to declare
and develop transnational law.
This Article yields, in some sense, a simple answer to the question of
what arbitral courts should do: They should take seriously their public role
as courts. They should embrace, promote, and protect judicial independence
and accountability, which includes and indeed depends upon transparency.
And in cases where they derive their legitimacy and jurisdiction from foreign
parties’ consent, they should limit the exercise of their power to the scope
of the parties’ contract. If they exercise power beyond that scope, it should
at least be confined by other limits on judicial jurisdiction. Arbitral court
judges are the key players who are poised to decide whether arbitral courts
will do this.
These judges seem to have strong incentives to provide parties—
including potentially the state—with requested confidentiality. States create
arbitral courts to cater to the needs of certain kinds of parties; they design
them to be a more attractive forum than arbitration. To have cases, and
simply to exist, arbitral courts need parties to want to resolve their disputes
with them. Granting confidentiality requests—allowed by the courts’
rules—may seem like a minor accommodation that serves all these
purposes. Likewise, arbitral courts, as new institutions, may be positioned to
try to establish and build their own power, and asserting jurisdiction over
non-parties, or issuing broad injunctions, may seem like a natural way to
assert judicial authority.
Currently, there are three sets of internally inconsistent incentive
structures that might make arbitral courts police confidentiality requests and
jurisdictional expansion more strictly. The first is the “market.” Making the
court attractive to potential parties may include offering confidentiality. But
it also requires the court to be transparent enough to advertise what it is
doing and to showcase its restraint, quality, and independence. Second, the
judges themselves may bring with them both a liberal and restrictive judicial
ethos. Third, the state may want arbitral courts to be at least somewhat
transparent and restrained to build the state’s and the courts’ legal legitimacy.
Each of these potential restraints is a two-sided coin with incentives that
lean both towards and away from transparency and restraint.
First, the so-called market. Arbitral courts are still quite new. In the
beginning, the need to establish a reputation to support the court’s legal and
sociological legitimacy may make arbitral court judges more reluctant to
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push the boundaries of their power and to grant parties’ confidentiality
requests. The standard explanation of arbitral courts and commercial courts
more generally is that they—like arbitration—are driven by parties’ (the
market’s) needs and desires. The pressure to cater to the potential
customer—the potential parties to transnational disputes—is real, both to
accumulate cases and to justify the court’s continued existence. Over time,
as the court establishes its reputation, it will gain more freedom to
accommodate parties’ demands for confidentiality and expansive use of
jurisdiction. Within certain bounds, the arbitral court may be able to rest on
its reputation, especially if it is exercising its power in secret.
Second, the arbitral court judges, especially the international judges, may
bring with them a restrictive judicial ethos. Hiring respected judges has
signaled and provided arbitral courts’ expertise in both commercial law and
managing cases as well as a liberal sense of judicial independence. It remains
to be seen whether arbitral court judges will also or alternatively be driven
by an arbitrator ethos that focuses on the parties’ dispute and commercial
reasonableness over common law development or the interests of third
parties. A judicial ethos might restrict judges’ grant of parties’ request for
confidentiality and include a sense of judicial restraint, prioritizing instead
the institutional and public law interests of the court, whereas an arbitrator
ethos might view confidentiality as an uncontroversial choice that is up to
the parties. As noted in Part II, even in traditional courts, judges have
increasingly recognized their role as more managerial and oriented towards
serving private parties’ dispute resolution needs. Arbitral courts could
provide a forum in which this kind of privatization is prized and cultivated.
Third, the state’s influence may reinforce parties’ preferences for
confidentiality—since the state is also trying to accommodate parties’
preferences to encourage parties to invest and to adjudicate disputes in the
state. Delaware provides the best example of a state trying to cater to the
market’s desire for confidential state-subsidized decision-making.312
Likewise, if the state appears as a party—or is otherwise involved in or
connected to a case—then it could use its influence to affect the proceedings
or the outcome of the case, or to keep the proceedings confidential. But as
discussed in Part IV, the state is also interested in the institutional integrity
and legitimacy of arbitral courts and as such it may promote arbitral courts’
jurisdictional restraint and preservation of transparency.
Existing structural incentives, therefore, may be strong at times for
arbitral courts to grant confidentiality requests and exercise broad
jurisdiction; at other times or in other situations, however, arbitral courts’
incentives may push in the opposite direction. Arbitral courts should resist
the urge to cater to the market in particular cases in favor of their longer312. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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term interest in showing themselves to be independent, sophisticated, and
legitimate courts.
The problem is that, from the institutional self-interest perspective,
arbitral courts need only enough transparency to establish and maintain
legitimacy and, possibly, to declare and develop substantive law. Complete
transparency may not be necessary to satisfy the “market,” and indeed, many
potential parties (and, at times, the state) may desire confidentiality. Over
time, as the institutions gain legitimacy and positive reputations for
independence, those reputations will give them cover for allowing more
confidentiality upon request, to the detriment of broader and longer-term
institutional interests. Neither the market nor the state necessarily promotes
their best interests by advocating more transparency—like arbitral tribunals,
they have interests in providing as much confidentiality as users desire.
Arbitral court judges will ultimately be deciding what constitutes enough
transparency for judicial independence and institution building, but they
may also have incentives to satisfy the parties and the state sufficiently to
ensure the continued existence of the arbitral court as an institution.
Arbitral courts should therefore tie themselves to the mast of publicity
today so that they do not fall to the temptations of confidentiality requests
tomorrow.313 Today, while they may still recognize the supremacy of their
institutional interests in transparency over the parties’ interests in
confidentiality, arbitral courts and their host states should bind themselves
to a commitment to publicity. Opinions discussing the importance of the
open justice principle, like those from the Caymans court, could be examples
of such commitments.314
Another way to do this might be to specify in bilateral or multilateral
recognition and enforcement agreements with other countries that court
decisions would be enforceable, or more easily enforceable, if those
decisions are routinely made public. Currently, the most common
requirements found in these agreements are that the court originally issuing
the judgment have jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties and that the
judgment not violate the sovereignty and public policy interests of the
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.315 In other words, the
313. Tying oneself to the mast refers to Ulysses asking his men to tie him to the mast of his ship
so that he could hear the Sirens’ song even though the song would otherwise make him jump into the
sea. See Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 631, 646 (2012).
314. See supra notes 241-245 and accompanying text; see also supra note 189 (describing SICC
opinions about open justice principles).
315. See, e.g., Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation art. 32, Apr. 6, 1983,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html; The GCC Convention for the Execution of
Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications, 1996, http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/GCC/;
Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates on Judicial
Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 22, China-U.A.E., Apr. 21, 2004,
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international regime over recognition and enforcement of judgments and
awards could favor enforcement of public awards from consistently public
courts and disfavor enforcement of confidential awards and/or awards
from insufficiently public courts, at least outside of arbitration.316 Another
option might be simply to publicly declare a commitment to openness for
the sake of independence and legitimacy. One problem, however, is that it
could be difficult to police this commitment if the parties involved and the
court are all in favor of confidentiality. How would one know that the
arbitral court was operating confidentially? The decision lies mainly in the
hands of arbitral court judges deciding individual confidentiality motions.
If they commit to openness, arbitral courts may ultimately be well
positioned to develop transnational law and have significant influence,
especially in areas of the law that are new or dominated by arbitration and
therefore lacking in many published precedents. The SICC’s decision in
Quoine is a prime example of this potential. It is consistent with the SICC’s
commitment to developing transnational commercial law, filling holes in the
common law often attributed to the proliferation of arbitration in certain
areas of contract law.317 As the Chief Justice of Singapore has said, “if major
and complex commercial cases are heard by arbitral tribunals rather than
courts, judicial precedents might become outdated, and this might be an
impediment to the development of a lex mercatoria.”318 In this atmosphere,
arbitral courts should be “well placed to develop jurisprudence.”319
This potential, however, requires arbitral courts to have both the
legitimacy and transparency of public adjudication. Doing so is not without
costs. Where parties prefer confidentiality, they may opt for arbitration over
arbitral courts if confidentiality is available in one but not the other. But not
all disputes require confidentiality.320 Dubai and Singapore, for example, are
establishing not just litigation destinations in the form of arbitral courts321
but multi-door legal hubs that cater to litigation, arbitration, and other kinds
of ADR simultaneously and in the same location. They therefore may be
https://tinyurl.com/y6xe5xte; Memorandum of Guidance as to Enforcement Between the Supreme
Court of Singapore and the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts ¶¶ 1-2, Jan. 19, 2015,
https://tinyurl.com/yyzbupfx; Memorandum of Guidance between the Supreme People’s Court of
the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of Singapore on Recognition and Enforcement
of Money Judgments in Commercial Cases arts. 1-2, China-Sing., Aug. 31, 2018,
https://tinyurl.com/yyd3ksy2.
316. Thanks to John Coyle for this recommendation.
317. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 278; Menon, supra note 184, at 234; Lord
Cwmgiedd, supra note 21.
318. Sundaresh Menon, Chief Just. of the Sup. Ct. of Sing., International Commercial Courts:
Towards a Transnational System of Dispute Resolution ¶ 54 (2015), https://tinyurl.com/y5zsw476.
319. Id. ¶ 55.
320. See, e.g., Nyarko, supra note 62, at 15 (disproving conventional wisdom that all international
commercial contracts contain arbitration clauses).
321. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 231.
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better able to attract more disputes overall—and exert more influence—by
establishing arbitral courts with stronger claims to legitimacy and
independence, as demonstrated by and through the courts’ openness and
legitimate exercises of more limited jurisdiction. The law that the arbitral
courts develop may then apply in these other more private fora (like
arbitration or mediation)—but its impact will be harder to observe.

VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has identified the emerging phenomenon of arbitral courts
and placed it in the context of trends of the judicialization of international
commercial arbitration and the privatization of court procedure. It has
argued that arbitral courts are testing the traditional boundaries between
public and private adjudication in ways that potentially put more pressure
on questions of consent-based jurisdiction than on public/private
distinctions. It has also highlighted the importance of legitimacy and
transparency for the full functioning of courts. It has warned of the dangers
of leaving confidentiality decisions up to parties who would likely favor
confidentiality even at the expense of institutional interests in open justice.
In the end, it argues that if arbitral courts can commit to legitimacy and
transparency, they may be able to have real global influence, including in
shaping substantive law.
Arbitral courts raise a host of additional questions that are ripe for
further scholarly inquiry. For example, arbitral courts create several conflicts
of law puzzles. How should other courts treat forum-selection clauses
choosing arbitral courts as the parties’ chosen forum—like an arbitration
clause or like a forum-selection clause? If arbitral courts enforce parties’
choice-of-law clauses designating non-state law, will that lead other courts
to do so? Will other courts enforce arbitral court decisions—and on what
basis? What res judicata effect will arbitral court judgments have
internationally? What preclusive effect does a confidential arbitral court
decision have?
Arbitral courts also raise broader questions about judicial reform and
access to justice. Will the creation of these courts produce positive effects
for the rest of the judiciary in the host states322 or simply focus resources
on “one percent procedure”?323 In Dubai, for example, will the creation of
a common law jurisdiction with common law courts including foreign
judges influence the rest of the local judiciary and result in liberalizing the
322. See, e.g., Alexandre Biard, International Commercial Courts in France: Innovation without Revolution?,
1 ERASMUS L. REV. 24 (2019).
323. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005 (2016).
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rest of the state and increasing the rule of law? The foreign judges at the
Astana International Financial Centre court do not have many cases yet but
have been tasked with touring the nation and educating Kazakh judges
about the common law.324 What will be the effect of these education tours?
Can the identity of the judges or other arbitration-like features change the
very nature of a state’s court system? Will the SICC exhibit more judicial
independence than other branches of the judiciary? Matthew Erie has begun
to investigate these questions;325 future work should continue these efforts.
One possibility is that arbitral courts might herald the advance of
increased rule of law in illiberal host states, but not necessarily have any
liberalizing effect, for example, spreading democratic governance.326
Arbitral courts have the potential to be strong legal institutions that uphold
the predictability of the law and promote economic stability and growth.
Especially in non-democratic or not completely democratic states, arbitral
courts’ outward facing motives seem to be to inspire investor confidence or
attract international commercial disputes, but may not have broader effects
of transforming the judiciary or the state.327 It is unclear how well those
financial motives will discipline the state or the courts. Arbitral courts may
be well-suited, indeed, to play the role of courts in authoritarian states—
lending legitimacy to the regime, enforcing state power, and encouraging
investment.328 Particularly if they eschew transparency, they may serve these
roles without yielding other trickle-down liberalizing effects.

324. In promotional materials, the AIFC court touted its intention “[t]o collaborate with and
establish working relationships with other courts in Kazakhstan, . . . [and] [t]o support the delivery of
high-quality legal education and training to meet the needs of lawyers and judges in Kazakhstan and
the Eurasia region.” Gabe Kirchheimer, Kazakhstan Adopts English Law to Inspire Investor Confidence,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y5mj5656.
325. Erie, supra note 132.
326. Cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 232,
233 (2012) (defining rule of law to not include democracy and human rights).
327. See Bookman, Adjudication Business, supra note 19, at 240.
328. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Judicial Power in Authoritarian States: The Russian Experience, in RULE BY
LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN R EGIMES 261, 281-82 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir
Moustafa eds., 2008).

